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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this dissertation is to extend the concept of organizational ambidexterity
(OA) into the domain of not-for-profit (NFP) organizations. These organizations are subject to
many of the same demands as their for-profit counterparts, yet research has not been conducted
on how NFPs manage the competing pressures of refining existing routines for efficiency with
the need to grow and innovate. This dissertation includes two portions: a quantitative analysis of
a large NFP-rating agency dataset and qualitative interviews with executive directors and
managers from within the food banking industry to identify the processes in use at a sample of
ambidextrous organizations.
The quantitative study uses a financial outcome—fiscal performance—in order to assess
the degree to which financial outcomes are affected by exploration and exploitation, two actions
central to the ambidexterity paradigm. Results of this study indicate that although exploration
and exploitation are related to fiscal performance within NFPs, the results vary greatly depending
on the industry in question.
The qualitative portion of the study indicates that three activities aid NFPs in engaging in
exploration and exploitation: managing knowledge, retaining professional talent, and enabling
leadership. This study concludes with implications for researchers and managers, as well as
suggestions for future research extensions.
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Chapter 1 – Introduction and Study Rationale
One of the central premises of strategic management is that through the effective
execution of strategy, leaders have the ability to alter their organization’s competitive position
within the larger environment (Eisenhardt, Furr, & Bingham, 2010; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000).
Dynamic capabilities research (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997)
suggests that organizations must continually acquire and realign resources in new ways in order
to survive and thrive in increasingly complex environments (De Geus, 2002; Piao, 2010). These
tenets apply to profit-seeking businesses, such as manufacturers of semiconductors (O’Reilly &
Tushman, 2008), software (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006), and consumer products (Tushman &
O’Reilly, 1996), as well as other types of organizations, such as hospitals (Rushing, 1974),
churches (Plowman et al., 2007), and health maintenance organizations (Ginsberg & Buchholtz,
1990). The development of repeatable, routinized processes (Adler et al., 2009) promotes the
efficient use of resources, but organizations must also resist the continual threat of becoming too
entrenched in a particular product, service, or process. This delicate balancing act has proven
difficult for many organizations to maintain (Adler et al., 2009; Benner & Tushman, 2003).
Within the domain of strategic management, the concept of organizational ambidexterity (OA)
(Eisenhardt et al., 2010; Simsek, Heavey, Veiga, & Souder, 2009) addresses the inherent tension
of developing repeatable, efficient routines and practices while also adapting to changing
conditions.
OA has been defined in more than twenty ways since its original conceptualization
(Duncan, 1976) and each definition attempts to capture the essence of an organization that can
pursue two different goals: exploration and exploitation. For the purposes of this dissertation,
1

Lubatkin, Simsek, Ling, and Veiga’s (2006: 647) parsimonious definition is used to describe
OA: “Ambidextrous firms are capable of exploiting existing competencies as well as exploring
new opportunities with equal dexterity.” Although OA has been studied in a number of different
industries and countries, one context remains unexplored that may inform our understanding of
how organizations engage in these two types of actions: the not-for-profit sector.
Not-for-profits (NFPs) are beginning to shoulder a greater burden of the development and
distribution of social programs that were previously considered to be under the purview of
governmental agencies (Smith & Lipsky, 1995; Van Slyke, 2007); consequently, NFPs must
balance the efficient delivery of existing services with changes in the greater environment that
may influence future demand (Ryan, 1999). These changes can include new or discontinued
funding opportunities (Sherlock & Gravelle, 2009) and shifts in growth potential (Kaplan &
Grossman, 2010) that complicate the efforts of NFPs to focus solely on existing programs and
services. Thus, NFPs provide an excellent context in which to explore OA because they are
constrained by the scope of their mission yet must develop new opportunities to counter overall
declines in rates of charitable giving.
Study Purpose
Despite recent attention to ambidextrous operations in the strategic management
literature, including a 2009 special issue in Organization Science, no studies to date have
attempted to assess the correspondence between ambidextrous operations within the NFP sector
(See Simsek et al., 2009 for a thorough review) even though this sector comprises more than 1.1
million organizations, contributes nearly 5% of the United States gross domestic product, and
employs more than 12.9 million workers (Sherlock & Gravelle, 2009). This study expands the
2

boundaries of the ambidexterity hypothesis to test its premises on a sample of NFP organizations
in order to determine the relationship between OA and organizational performance within this
unique organizational context. This study also examines a sample of NFP food banks to
understand the processes that their managers use to engage in high levels of exploration and
exploitation.
Given the effects of ambidextrous operations on overall organizational effectiveness, two
key research questions arise. Specifically:
RQ1. What impact does ambidexterity have on financial performance?
RQ2. How do ambidextrous organizations engage in exploration and exploitation activities?
Assumptions
One of the key assumptions of NFP research is that best practice methods and measures
from for-profit business can be applied to not-for-profit organizations (Kaplan, 2001). The direct
social impact of strategic NFP actions can be nearly impossible to measure reliably (Rojas,
2000), but organizations that focus on business-related routines such as performance
measurement, reporting, and stakeholder management are still expected to outperform
organizations within a similar “industry” (Salamon, Geller, & Mengel, 2010; Siciliano, 1996).
As NFPs embrace the professionalism of services and management (Hwang & Powell, 2009),
many may improve their performance through the implementation of strategies initially
developed to benefit the for-profit sector. However, if NFPs are implementing professional
practices from the for-profit sector in a haphazard manner (Rojas, 2000), then ambidexterity may
provide a common vocabulary to describe the competing pressures that NFPs face: the balance of
long-term growth prospects with the efficient delivery of current programs. The field of strategic
3

management and society as a whole are likely to benefit from a more holistic approach to
growing societal wealth by including NFPs as a worthwhile source of data and a beneficiary of
empirical research findings from the strategy literature.
NFPs make a particularly compelling context for understanding OA due to a number of
constraints not typically seen in the OA literature. First, NFPs organize around a central mission
that defines the scope of their programs, products, and services and makes growth through
unrelated diversification unlikely. Second, many NFPs are local or regional in nature (e.g.,
Virginia Beach SPCA, Knox Area Rescue Ministries), which eliminates geographic expansion as
a viable growth opportunity. Finally, third-party agencies rate NFPs to identify how each
organization spends its money. Expenses related to utilities, property, and professional staff are
considered inefficient as they represent expenditures that do not go directly to program expenses.
Consequently, NFPs have an incentive to maximize efficiency within a constrained set of growth
opportunities, resulting in an unlikely setting for ambidextrous behavior. These conditions make
NFPs an excellent context in which to view OA and to study if and how NFP managers attempt
to engage in exploration and exploitation.
Overview of Methodology
This dissertation uses a mixed methods approach to understand the effects of
ambidextrous operations on organizational effectiveness and the underlying processes at work in
a subset of ambidextrous NFPs.
First, the quantitative data for this study are IRS-990 financial filings organized by the
third-party NFP monitoring organization, Charity Navigator (CN). Data span the fiscal years
ending between January 2008 and December 2009. Based on CN’s ratings of two theoretically4

relevant dimensions, exploration and exploitation, organizations were clustered into groups.
Following this categorization, means tests were conducted to determine the fiscal performance
levels associated with exploration and exploitation. Additionally, robust clustered regression was
used to determine the relationship between ratings of exploration and exploitation and NFP fiscal
performance. The sample covers a wide variety of different industries, allowing for further
analysis of organizations that vary in their levels of capital intensity (orchestras vs. food banks),
size (national vs. local), and age (old vs. young organizations).
Second, the qualitative portion of this dissertation examines a sample of NPFs from the
food banking industry in order to understand the processes by which organizations
simultaneously engage in high levels of exploration and exploitation. Through four site visits and
a series of semi-structured interviews, data were gathered and analyzed for major themes related
to managing this paradox. These findings are discussed in conjunction with their ability to relate
to the for-profit strategy literature.
Contributions
This study makes a number of contributions to the ambidexterity literature base. First, the
use of a large-scale dataset provides the statistical power to isolate industry-specific differences
in OA. Many of the larger samples in extant ambidexterity research have been limited to singleindustry research contexts such as software (Venkatraman et al., 2007), biotechnology
(Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004), or robotics (Katila & Ahuja, 2002). Meanwhile, empirical tests of
ambidexterity that use alternate methodologies such as case studies (Adler, Goldoftas, & Levine,
1999; Han, 2005; Tarafdar & Gordon, 2007) are necessarily limited to single organizations or
industries, making comparisons difficult if not impossible. The use of a large-scale, multi5

industry dataset contributes to the ambidexterity literature by isolating the effects of
ambidextrous operations on organizational performance while also allowing for comparisons
across different industries.
Second, this study contributes to the ongoing debate of whether or not ambidexterity is a
continuous or orthogonal construct (Gupta, Smith, & Shalley, 2006). Although exploration and
exploitation were originally considered trade-offs that needed to be balanced lest an organization
find itself mediocre at both (March, 1991), more recent research has suggested that these two
concepts are orthogonal rather than continuous (Atuahene-Gima, 2005; Katila & Ahuja, 2002;
Uotila, Maula, Keil, & Zahra, 2009). Consistent with prior studies, the presence of a significant
interaction term between exploration and exploitation would provide evidence that exploration
and exploitation are orthogonal and can be pursued simultaneously; however, this interaction has
not always been significant in prior research (Bierly & Daly, 2007).
Third, the use of a mixed-methods research design provides a better understanding of the
underlying processes at work within ambidextrous organizations. Although a few previous
studies of ambidexterity have employed a mixed-methods research design (Beckman, 2006;
Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004a), this remains the exception rather than the norm. The use of
qualitative interviews to more thoroughly describe the underlying processes at work within NFPs
contributes to two different literature streams: ambidexterity and NFPs. By introducing a widely
studied theoretical perspective from strategic management to the unique context of NFPs, this
study begins to make connections between two literature streams that could benefit from greater
coordination. This study examines ambidexterity within this context to assess the robustness of
this theory beyond its traditional context of for-profit firms.
6

Organization of the Dissertation
This mixed-methods dissertation follows a sequential explanatory strategy (Ivankova,
Creswell, & Stick, 2006). Sequential explanatory research begins with a preliminary quantitative
study followed by a qualitative study that mirrors the pattern established by other organizational
researchers (e.g. Edmondson, 1996; Novak & Sellnow, 2009; Sutton & Rafaeli, 1988). This
process first assesses the general pattern of relationships between the variables of interest and
then follows with in-depth analysis of a subset from the full sample to understand more clearly
the underlying mechanisms driving the quantitative results.
This dissertation is comprised of six chapters. This first chapter has introduced the
general research question and setting for the present study. Chapter 2 provides a review of the
literature and the hypotheses developed for this study. Chapter 3 describes the research sample,
methodology, and analytic techniques employed to answer the research questions and evaluate
the hypotheses described above. Chapter 4 presents a discussion of the quantitative and
qualitative findings of this study, as well as the caveats associated with this particular project and
the challenges related to interpreting the hypothesis tests. Chapter 5 offers a discussion of the
theoretical and managerial implications of this research and provides suggestions for future
research that may build from the present study. Finally, chapter 6 presents the conclusion of this
dissertation.

7

Chapter 2 – Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
Organizational ambidexterity (OA) is a concept that describes the capability of firms that
leverage efficient existing routines while simultaneously adapting to changing situations in order
to pursue new growth opportunities (Lubatkin et al., 2006; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). First
conceptualized as the balance between the opposing forces of exploration and exploitation
(Duncan, 1976), this concept has evolved from an organizational learning phenomenon
(Levinthal & March, 1993; March, 1991) to become known as OA (Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996),
which has most recently received attention as a capability of key strategic importance for
organizational performance (Eisenhardt et al., 2010). Some scholars even suggest that the
ambidexterity hypothesis has gathered enough empirical support to be called an emerging
research paradigm in organizational studies (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008).
Currently, researchers use different meanings and measures of OA across research
settings, which makes comparisons of their findings difficult. The terms “exploration” and
“exploitation” are used commonly in the ambidexterity literature (Gupta et al., 2006; Levinthal
& March, 1993; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008), but scholars also refer to these pressures as the
need to balance “search” with “stability” (Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003), “flexibility” with
“efficiency” (Adler et al., 1999) and “alignment” with “adaptability” (Tiwana, 2008). Even with
an agreed-upon lexicon for discussing these organizational pressures, many unsolved facets of
the ambidexterity paradox remain, such as the role that time plays in ambidexterity and how
different organizational structures influence these competing tensions (Simsek et al., 2009).
Various streams of literature in the field of organization sciences have attempted to
reconcile the two opposing forces of exploration and exploitation (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008).
8

These themes of exploiting carefully refined routines for efficient operations while exploring
new capabilities and offerings are now found in strategic management (Auh & Menguc, 2005;
Burgelman, 1991; Ebben & Johnson, 2005), organizational learning (Gupta et al., 2005; He &
Wong, 2004; Levinthal & March, 1993), technological innovation (Jansen, Van Den Bosch, &
Volberda, 2006) and organizational adaptation (Burgelman, 1991; Probst & Raisch, 2005). As
literature continues to build in this area, we better understand the importance of carefully
balancing these two processes; what remains less clear is how organizations actually engage in
both processes (Adler et al., 2009). Much of the difficulty in achieving this balance is due to the
inherent tension that organizations experience while trying to streamline operations and develop
efficient processes throughout the organization to the detriment of the processes related to
creative exploration (Cole & Matsumiya, 2007). Each of these two processes, exploration and
exploitation, have been linked to organizational performance, but research suggests that the
interactive effect of both is the key to long-term sustained performance (He & Wong, 2004 ) and
longevity (De Geus, 2002; Piao, 2010). The juxtaposition of these two factors results in the
matrix presented in Figure 1 and forms the basis for the quantitative portion of this study.
Specializing in Efficiency or Exploration
Organizational operations may improve through standard operating procedures and
repeatable routines (Benner & Tushman, 2003). The application of rigorous scientific
measurement applied to organizational tasks in the nascent field of management science sought
the single best method (Taylor, 1911) to perform a task, such that workers would perform routine
tasks in a consistent, optimal manner. This attention to replicability initially targeted tasks
involving manual labor such as the handling of pig iron or the laying of bricks (Gilbreth &
9

Gilbreth, 1919), jobs that could be de-skilled into their component actions and subsequently
timed, measured, and refined. These time and motion studies demonstrated that organizations
that chose to pursue efficient operations with highly structured, repetitious tasks should produce
greater levels of productivity; however, later studies determined that the routinization of tasks
has the opposite effect on organizational productivity through its dehumanizing work conditions
that may lead to worker burnout (Adler, 1993). Much of the early management research that
focused on improving productivity and organizational performance attempted to replace
idiosyncratic worker behaviors with repeatable, standardized, efficient operations; however, this
minimized the variance in each individual’s contribution. Thus, as efficiency grows at the
expense of new ideas or processes (Benner & Tushman, 2003), an organization’s overall ability
to improve its standing in the environment could be compromised (De Geus, 2002; Levinthal &
Myatt, 1994).
Although the term “scientific management” has fallen by the wayside, its legacy lives on
with efforts to streamline operations with standard operating procedures and continuous
improvements to process management (Benner & Tushman, 2003). As actions develop into
repeatable routines, organizations build competency and efficiency through repetition as learning
effects accrue (Cohen, 1992). Even today, a number of popular programs (e.g., Six Sigma, ISO
9000, de-layering, reengineering) focus exclusively on minimizing process variance and
promoting standardization for organizational success (Benner & Tushman, 2003).
Devoting time and energy to exploring new options comes at the cost of refining existing
skills and routines (Levinthal & March, 1981), which, when coupled with a focus on efficient
execution, can often result in returns that are sooner, surer, and easier (March, 1991). Hence,
10

organizations tend to favor these types of familiar routines rather than investing in riskier new
processes that may yield unpredictable gains (Levinthal & March, 1993). These
conceptualizations of ambidexterity imply a trade-off such that the pursuit of one strategy results
in foregoing the other, which Abernathy (1978) termed the “productivity dilemma,” in which
each strategy could only be pursued to the detriment of the other. In other words, by engaging in
both strategies simultaneously, firms risk mediocre performance of each (March, 1991), rather
than the reaping synergies found between them. Based on this conceptualization of exploration
and exploitation as trade-offs under which higher performance benefits are reaped when firms
refine their existing routines, the following hypothesis is proposed:
H1a: Exploitation-focused organizations within Figure 1 (quadrant 2) will
experience greater financial performance than organizations that attempt
an ambidextrous strategy (quadrant 4).
Early work on organizational learning assumed that exploration and exploitation were
mutually exclusive trade-offs. To the extent that an organization excels at a particular skill, the
attractiveness of improving a new capability—which may potentially cannibalize an existing
capability—makes experimentation and innovation less attractive (Levitt & March, 1988).
Conversely, work on this delicate balance suggests that ongoing development of efficient
routines, coupled with the ability to adapt to major changes, is the key to long-term
organizational survival (De Geus, 2002).
The concept of the competency trap (Levitt & March, 1988; Liu, 2006) speaks to the
unwavering refinement of existing competencies with little regard for the development of new
11

competencies. In these cases, core competencies actually become core rigidities (LeonardBarton, 1992) as organizations encounter difficulty adapting to changing environmental trends,
customer demands, or technological changes. Many of the oldest companies still in existence
have undergone major transformations over their lifetimes, and many had to destroy their core
competencies altogether by changing industries or strategies order to survive (De Geus, 2002;
O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008). Based on this conceptualization of exploration and exploitation as
trade-offs, under which greater performance benefits accrue to firms that explore new markets
and products (Piao, 2010), the following hypothesis is proposed:
H1b: Exploration-focused organizations within Figure 1 (quadrant 3) will
experience greater financial performance than organizations that attempt
an ambidextrous strategy (quadrant 4).
Reconciling Efficiency with Exploration – Organizational Ambidexterity
What began as the study of competing trade-offs in the organizational learning literature
(Floyd & Lane, 2000; March, 1991) is now coalescing into its own research paradigm (Raisch &
Birkinshaw, 2008). Recent research has taken the viewpoint that exploration and exploitation are
orthogonal activities that do not require a trade-off; rather, these two actions can positively
interact (Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Uotila et al., 2009). This opens the door to the possibility of
engaging in both rather than having to choose one focus over the other. Instead of
conceptualizing ambidexterity as a trade-off between two mutually exclusive options, the view
of these pressures as orthogonal, rather than continuous, has led to a conceptualization of OA as
a paradox (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008).

12

A growing body of theoretical and empirical research has refined the concept of OA in an
attempt to ascertain its antecedents, moderators, outcomes, and contextual boundaries (Raisch &
Birkinshaw, 2008; Simsek, 2009). In fact, two thorough review articles (Raisch & Birkinshaw,
2008; Simsek et al., 2009) detail the dramatic advancement of the concept of OA across more
than twenty empirical articles that have attempted to isolate the antecedents (Beckman, 2006;
Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004b; Kyriakopoulos & Moorman, 2004), moderators (Ebben &
Johnson, 2005; Li & Atuahene-Gima, 2001) and outcomes (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004; Han,
Kim, & Kim, 2001; Katila & Ahuja, 2002) of ambidextrous operations. Studies have examined
firms in Korea (Han et al., 2001), Singapore (He & Wong, 2004), China (Li & Atuahene-Gima,
2001), the Netherlands (Kyriakopoulos & Moorman, 2004), Spain (Revilla, Prieto, & Rodriguez,
2011) and the United States (Bierly & Daly, 2007; Hill & Birkinshaw, 2006). The robustness of
this theory can be seen clearly through the variety of these studies that expand the boundaries
and applicability of OA across contexts.
The synthesis of this literature stream has produced a new typology of ambidextrous
behavior types (Simsek et al., 2009). Although it is possible to engage in these two competing
actions simultaneously within a single structural unit, splitting the structural and temporal
dimensions apart to resolve the inherent tension between these two demands results in four
possible types of ambidexterity (Simsek et al., 2009). The temporal facet of ambidexterity
focuses on whether organizations pursue exploration and exploitation simultaneously or
sequentially. The structural facet of ambidexterity focuses on whether organizations pursue
exploration and exploitation within a singular organizational structure or across multiple
structures. Juxtaposing these two facets yields four possible combinations for understanding OA,
13

and by shifting the time and place that these two paradoxical cognitive approaches occur, this
research has attempted to tease out the underlying processes within OA to better understand how
these pressures are able to co-exist. The development of this typology offers a way beyond the
mindset that exploration and exploitation are trade-offs to focus future ambidexterity research
onto more systematic investigations of the specific processes, structures, and contexts that
facilitate OA (Simsek et al., 2009).
Table 1 presents an overview of quantitative studies that have linked OA to different
outcomes using a variety of research methods and industry contexts. Inclusion criteria for this
table were a quantitative or mixed methods study design and OA as an independent variable in
the study. The following section details some of the key research findings from this literature
stream, as well as opportunities that have yet to be explored and the hypotheses that emerge from
the unanswered questions in the literature.
Antecedents of Ambidexterity
Given its generally favorable relationship with organizational outcomes (Venkatraman et
al., 2007), researchers and managers are interested in better understanding the conditions that
facilitate OA.
Contextual Antecedents
The organizational context is comprised of the systems, processes, and beliefs that shape
individual-level behaviors within an organization (Burgelman, 1983; Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1994).
Ghoshal and Bartlett (1994) proposed four key interpersonal aspects of the organizational
context for developing a culture of ambidexterity: discipline, stretch, support, and trust.
Discipline asks organizational members to contribute more than the minimum in order to achieve
14

organizational goals. Promoting stretch within an organization pushes members to pursue more
ambitious goals, rather than focusing on safe and predictable ones. Support allows individuals to
assist each other and to gain access to needed resources. Finally, trust requires that organizational
members honor the commitments they make so that others can rely on them to accomplish
needed goals. The concept of trust, echoed in later work (Adler et al., 1999), as well as worker
training and job enrichment, has been found to facilitate effective work across multiple
situations. These contextual and behavior factors do not automatically create ambidextrous
organizations (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004a), but they do permit ambidexterity to emerge as
organizational members engage in these practices.
Leadership Antecedents
Research focusing on the leadership aspects that facilitate ambidexterity has explored the
concept of ambidextrous managers as well as how a CEO’s functional background influences
ambidexterity (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2004; 2007). In this sense, the concept of ambidexterity
resides in a manager’s mind and experience rather than in the specific structures or processes put
in place to engage in both actions at once (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). Beckman (2006)
describes how founding team composition and former company affiliations influence exploitive
and exploratory behavior. Lubatkin and colleagues (2006) also look at top management
characteristics that may influence OA and suggest that smaller firms may benefit more
ambidexterity based on individual characteristics (Chang & Hughes, 2012) and cognitions
(Thongpapanl, De Clercq, & Dimov, 2012) rather than structurally-driven factors such as
creating separate units to pursue different goals. Other interpersonal factors, such as decisionmaking authority at the managerial level, increase the likelihood of managerial ambidexterity
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(Mom, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 2009). Decision autonomy also strengthens the relationship
between adaptability and organizational performance (Thongpapanl et al., 2012), suggesting that
providing individuals with more opportunities to engage in novel behaviors will increase their
likelihood of exploratory actions. Different managerial leadership styles also influence OA;
middle managers can facilitate exploitative learning through a transactional leadership style and
top managers can facilitate explorative learning through a transformational leadership style (Sun
& Anderson, 2012).
Structural Antecedents
Studies of OA’s structural antecedents downplay the effects of the top management team,
board of directors, and other members of the organization’s upper echelon to focus on the
organization itself as the key actor (He & Wong, 2004). Spatial separation offers one way to
reconcile the tension between exploration and exploitation. The act of physically moving units
with different goals farther from the rest of the organization (e.g., PARC Xerox, Lockheed
Martin Skunkworks) permits some parts of the organization to focus on exploratory goals while
other parts of the organization focus on exploitative goals. The use of loose coupling between
different types of work units permits different goals, management styles, and incentive plans to
drive the simultaneous pursuit of exploration and exploitation (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2004).
Structural antecedents to ambidexterity focus on how parallel structures allow organizational
members to switch between different structures depending on specific tasks. Processes such as
outsourcing are also ways to offload exploitation processes. In the Internet banking industry, the
use of outsourcing positively influences efficiency but negatively influences adaptability
(Weigelt & Sarkar, 2012). In addition to the physical location and layout of organizations, other
16

structural factors, such as the degree of informal connectedness between organizational members
and the degree of work unit formalization, also influence ambidextrous operations (Jansen,
Tempelaar, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 2009). In this same setting, highly-centralized
decision-making structures can negatively impact exploratory innovation. Structured hierarchical
replication processes, such as those at IKEA, permit variance at the individual store level, but the
organizational structure minimizes variance at higher levels in order to ensure consistency in
values, vision, and image across different locations (Jonsson & Foss, 2012). These direct effects
provide an understanding of the factors that influence the likelihood of ambidextrous behaviors
occurring. In addition to describing the types of structures, leaders, and contexts that influence
OA, other research has examined the different types of moderators that influence the relationship
between OA and a variety of outcomes.
Moderators of Ambidexterity
Many studies have also explored the contingent relationships that interact to influence the
impact of ambidextrous organizational operations on organizational performance. Consistent
with the idea of a liability of newness (Freeman, Carroll, & Hannan, 1983), the liability of
senescence (Ruef, 2002), or firm age, has been shown to negatively impact the relationship
between ambidextrous operations and firm sales growth (Venkatraman et al., 2007). Firm size
has also been empirically determined to be a moderator of the relationship between product
development path and the number of products on the market (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004).
Larger firms typically have more rigid routines that make ambidextrous operations more
difficult, but some of these challenges may be overcome with effective alliance portfolios (Lavie,
Kang, & Rosenkopf, 2011). Levels of exploitation moderate the relationship between exploration
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and strategic learning (Sirén, Kohtamäki, & Kuckertz, 2012), suggesting that the most effective
learning occurs when exploration is coupled with the utility derived from exploiting new
knowledge. Additionally, the proportion of shareholders representing particular global regions
moderates the relationship between exploitation and strategic renewal (Kwee, Van Den Bosch, &
Volberda, 2011), suggesting that particular stakeholder blocs may be more receptive to the
exploratory actions necessary for growth. In addition to these organizational-level factors, many
individual-level factors also influence the relationship between OA and organizational
performance, including the orientation of customer service representatives (Jasmand, Blazevic,
& de Ruyer, 2012), the degree of task conflict (Kostopoulous & Bozionelos, 2011), the
behavioral complexity of top management teams (Carmeli & Halevi, 2009), and informal
personal coordination between organizational members (Mom et al., 2009).
Finally, externalities that moderate the impact of OA on performance include factors such
as environmental competitiveness, which positively impacts the relationship between exploratory
innovation and financial performance, and environmental dynamism which negatively impacts
the relationship between exploitive innovation and financial performance (Jansen et al., 2009). In
addition to these antecedents and moderators of OA, other research has explored the impact of
OA on performance outcomes at a variety of levels of analysis.
Outcomes of Ambidexterity
One of the prime goals of any organization, long-term survival (Andriopoulos & Lewis,
2009; De Geus, 2002; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996) is a result of ambidextrous operations.
Beyond a systematic mindset towards continual renewal, adaptation, and growth, OA has also
been empirically linked with performance outcomes such as a greater number of products on the
market (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004), sales growth within the software industry (Venkatraman et
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al., 2007), and new product development (Revilla et al., 2011). Hill and Birkinshaw (2006) also
found support for a positive relationship between ambidexterity and venture unit performance
and He and Wong (2004) found support for an interactive effect between exploration and
exploitation when studying the effect of ambidexterity on sales growth rates. Ambidextrous
behaviors have been linked to lower levels of efficiency in a sample of customer service
representatives (Jasmand et al., 2012), which supports the view of exploration and exploitation as
trade-offs, but these findings are outweighed by many other studies that report positive outcomes
of ambidexterity.
Despite the overwhelmingly positive support for ambidexterity’s effects on
organizational performance, three studies reported non-significant relationships or were unable
to support the interaction of exploration and exploitation on performance (Ambrosini, Bowman,
& Schoenberg, 2011; Bierly & Daly, 2007; Lin, Yang, & Demirkan, 2007). These findings add
support to the idea that these concepts may not be orthogonal, even though other studies
(Atuahene-Gima, 2005; Katila & Ahuja, 2002) find support for a significant interactive effect of
exploration and exploitation on organizational performance. With a few exceptions, the
empirical studies presented in Table 1 report positive relationships between ambidexterity and a
range of organizational outcomes. As a result of the findings typically reported in this body of
literature, the following hypotheses are offered:
H1a’: Ambidextrous organizations within Figure 1 (Quadrant 4) will
experience greater financial performance than organizations that attempt
an exploitation focus (Quadrant 2).

19

H1b’: Ambidextrous organizations within Figure 1 (Quadrant 4) will
experience greater financial performance than organizations that attempt
an exploration focus (Quadrant 3).
The overall positive impact of ambidexterity on organizational performance also permits
the following hypothesis regarding the lack of either focus or balance:
H2: Organizations with equally low levels of exploration and exploitation
(Quadrant 1) experience the lowest financial performance.
Finally, in order to assess the overall impact of ambidexterity on financial performance,
the following hypothesis is offered:
H3: Organizational ambidexterity will have a significant, positive effect on
financial performance.
Synthesizing and Extending Organizational Ambidexterity
To date, OA research has focused on the for-profit sector, excluding NFPs entirely. Hightech industries such as software development (Venkatraman et al., 2007), new product design
(Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009), robotics (Katila & Ahuja, 2002), and biotechnology (Rothaermel
& Deeds, 2004) are common settings for empirical tests of OA. These types of industries, where
creativity, innovation, and efficient production are all necessary, may make the impact of OA
more direct. Methodologically, most studies have either employed case-study or survey-based
approaches to determine an organization’s ambidextrous abilities (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004a).
More recent studies (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009; Kwee et al., 2011; O’Reilly & Tushman,
2011; Sun & Anderson, 2012) have begun to incorporate qualitative methods to delve deeper
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into the processes and mindsets found in ambidextrous organizations. Although this research has
been helpful in clarifying the concepts central to OA as well as the impact of OA on
organizational performance, a major context that remains unexplored is that of NFPs.
Although the mission of NFPs is radically different from that of for-profit firms, NFPs
must also compete for scarce resources (Stone & Crittenden, 1993), develop novel strategies to
ensure their ongoing survival and relevance (Sherlock & Gravelle, 2009), and deliver adequate
performance levels to satisfy various stakeholders (Kaplan, 2001). Given the similar demands yet
contradictory outcomes desired, as well as the increasing need to improve NFP performance
(Herman & Renz, 1998), knowledge of how OA influences performance within this sector seems
particularly appropriate. Because continued survival alone is, at best, a weak indicator of
efficiency, effectiveness, or social impact (Dees, 1998), NFPs are coming under greater pressure
from various stakeholder groups to efficiently use resources (e.g., cash donations, gifts,
volunteers) to accomplish the organization’s stated mission (Salamon et al., 2010) and must also
effectively communicate their successes to various stakeholder groups. The modern environment
requires non-profits to seek novel funding sources, engage in new forms of outreach to
communicate with members, develop new measures for effectiveness (Ritchie & Kolodinsky,
2003; Sawhill & Williamson, 2001), implement practices and reports that facilitate transparency
and accountability (Herman, Renz, & Heimovics, 1996; Speckbacher, 2003), and begin to
incorporate best practices from the for-profit business world. Extending the OA paradigm from
strategic management to NFPs offers an opportunity to understand if and how this sector is
managing the competing demands of exploration and exploitation.
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Literature Review Conclusion
This chapter provided an overview of the relevant literature related to OA within the
strategic management literature. A review of current research, both empirical and conceptual,
shows a paucity of literature outside the for-profit domain, suggesting that the present study
offers a contribution by extending this well-known strategic management concept to a unique
and important context. The following chapter presents the methods used to test the three
hypotheses stated above, the measures used to operationalize each of the variables within the
study, the control variables that will be included to minimizing confounding, and a discussion of
the unique challenges in assessing organizational performance and effectiveness in NFP
research.
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Chapter 3 – Methods and Context
This chapter presents the methodology used to conduct this study. A general overview of
the unique not-for-profit context is provided, with a discussion of the inherent difficulties that
researchers encounter while attempting to relate NFP activities to organizational performance or
effectiveness. This chapter also describes the sample, measures, and data collection process and
concludes with an explanation of the statistical analyses employed.
The recent focus on NFPs as a force for improving communities and alleviating major
social issues has received a great deal of recent attention from academics (Calás, Smircich, &
Bourne, 2009; Dart, 2004; Korosec & Berman, 2006; Tan, Williams, & Tan, 2005) and
practitioners (Geller, Abramson, & de Leon, 2010; Salamon et al., 2010) interested in
ameliorating persistent social problems. The non-profit and charitable sectors of the United
States economy are comprised of more than 1.5 million organizations, employ nearly 10% of the
workforce (12.9 million individuals), and contribute more than 5% of the overall gross domestic
product ($1.4 trillion in total revenue) (Sherlock & Gravelle, 2009). These organizations cover
the full spectrum of organizational missions and range from highly specialized local charities
(e.g., Knox Area Rescue Ministries, Virginia Beach SPCA) to nationwide organizations that
oversee the efforts of multiple chapters (e.g., Red Cross, Planned Parenthood, Habitat for
Humanity).
The changing face of government and its shrinking role in the provision of social and
welfare services in the United States necessitate the expansion of services offered by non-profit
and charitable organizations (Boris & Steuerle, 1999; Salamon, 1995; Smith & Lipsky, 1993) in
23

order to alleviate social issues (e.g., homelessness, hunger) or improve artistic or cultural
offerings (e.g., symphonies, zoos, botanical gardens). Performance measurement has not always
been highly valued in the world of charity and social improvement (Dees, 2007; Speckbacher,
2008), largely due to the difficulty in reporting reliable, timely, and cost-effective results. Failure
to efficiently allocate funds to the organization’s stated mission results in rebuke from the NFP
rating community, such as this warning to donors found on the rating website VolunteerGuide:
“For every dollar you donate, very good charities will use 80 cents
or more towards their charitable purpose, while the rest of your
donation pays for fundraising costs, administrative expenses, and
management salaries. On the other hand, for every dollar donated
to a bad charity, as little as 40 cents (or worse) will go towards the
charitable purpose. The rest of your donation will pay for a poorly
managed or inefficient bureaucracy, perhaps with the involvement
of too many for-profit middlemen in the fundraising efforts,”
(volunteerguide.com, emphasis added).
VolunteerGuide provides no explanation for why 80 cents determines the cutoff point
between very good and good charities and all attempts to contact the organization’s
administrators for clarification on their methodology have gone unanswered. CN offers a similar
warning to donors: “We believe that those spending less than a third of their budget on program
expenses are simply not living up to their missions. Charities demonstrating such gross
inefficiency receive zero points for their overall organizational efficiency score,” (emphasis
added). Like VolunteerGuide, CN offers no rationale for 33 cents on the dollar as the
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determinant of “gross inefficiency.” This unwavering emphasis on efficiently delivering services
and having expense ratios reported by third-party organizations places pressure on NFPs to
report high levels of efficiency (Tinkelman, 2009); however, OA suggests that these same
organizations must resist the temptation to simply cut expenses to the bone and risk falling into a
competency trap (Liu, 2006) whereby they are unable to adapt their service offerings as needed.
In order to ensure their long-term survival, NFPs must be flexible enough to respond to changing
conditions within the greater environment as new opportunities and threats arise (Sherlock &
Gravelle, 2009), which are often riskier and more expensive (March, 1991), and potentially less
efficient in terms of reported expense ratios.
NFPs are facing greater limits of social support and must meet expectations for delivering
services efficiently while growing and innovating (Salamon et al., 2010). Despite these demands,
unlike their for-profit counterparts, NFPs are often locked into narrow, mission-based offerings
with limited ability to diversify beyond their stated mission without facing backlash from donors,
board members, and volunteers (Salamon et al., 2010). Even without the ambidexterity
terminology in the NFP literature, the sentiment that NFPs must balance the need for new and
innovative programs with existing service provisions is expressed by the comments reported in a
recent Johns Hopkins University study on non-profit innovation and performance measurement.
In the words of one frustrated executive director:
“Innovation can be challenging when private funders have
committed to organizations based on what they know already
works. Funders are mixed about whether or not they are willing to
take risks on innovation. Risk taking is a general challenge in our
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sector and needs to, when appropriate, be rewarded not penalized
when something doesn’t work 100 percent,” (Salamon et al., 2010:
17)
A second executive director expressed the need to explore new options for the
organization, but felt constrained by the boundaries of the organization’s mission and the need to
focus on existing services instead of new opportunities:
“Innovation is great, and I support it, but there is also a huge need
for funding to support the programs (that get more expensive every
year) that are part of our current operations. I think it is a
dangerous practice to encourage innovation when organizations are
finding it hard to sustain their core mission due to difficulty in
attracting funding for basic operating costs (Salamon et al., 2010:
17).
Because of these competing pressures to continue with existing programs while also
seeking new innovations in the field, managers may find themselves overwhelmed at having to
pursue both simultaneously. These quotes mirror the inherent tension within the ambidexterity
literature, but couch the trade-offs in terms unique to the NFP sector. As organizations seek to
broaden their impact, pursue new funding opportunities, or increase their visibility, they must
temper this growth and exploration with an expectation from stakeholders that the first goal is to
provide demanded services and products with a high level of efficiency. This perception that the
organization must explore innovative new missions in order to keep the organization relevant is
26

also noted in this quote from an executive director who understands the need to do both, but is
hampered by a lack of time and staffing to actually capitalize on exploration:
“Staff time is a huge problem, not just time to attend conferences
or read periodicals, but the time that’s necessary afterward, to
digest, think about how to apply / implement what one has
learned,” (Salamon et al., 2010: 8).
In this regard, the executive director is describing an organization that, even if it had the
resources to actively explore for new options, would be limited in its ability to exploit them
effectively afterwards. This “failure trap” (March, 2003; Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2006) is common
in cases where a lack of adequate exploitation results in failure, thus spurring more exploration
and a constant shifting of different strategies to find one that will work with minimal
exploitation. This tension, especially within these types of organizations with scarce resources,
demanding stakeholder groups, and a commitment to a constraining mission, makes the concept
of ambidexterity particularly relevant to an NFP context. Many for-profit organizations cope
with the same constraints, but under a mandate to maximize shareholder or owner value, may
engage in very different activities as a way to generate revenue. The constraints from the stated
mission make it difficult for NFPs to explore too widely beyond the scope of their organizational
goals, but NFP managers likely still need to engage in both actions for continued success.
Linking the use of OA practices to an objective, measureable outcome would prove beneficial in
a sector traditionally plagued by performance measurement challenges (Ritchie & Kolodinsky,
2003; Sawhill & Williamson, 2001) because NFP managers would be able to point to the
demonstrable impact of efficiently seeking new growth opportunities.
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Challenges in Assessing NFP Effectiveness
Given criticism in the for-profit strategy literature of the unwavering focus on
performance (Cameron, 1986), the NFP arena is a particularly fertile area for exploration
because performance is both a poorly-defined topic (Rojas, 2000; Sawhill & Williamson, 2001)
and one of great interest to NFP managers (Herman & Renz, 1998), volunteers (Murnighan,
Kim, & Metzger, 1993), donors (Salamon et al., 2010), and watchdog organizations (Szper &
Prakash, 2011). These various stakeholder groups are only able to assess the organization’s
effectiveness at achieving its stated mission if information is made available about ongoing
efforts (Speckbacher, 2003). The topics of measurable progress and impact, accountability, and
organizational effectiveness are of interest to practitioners and scholars alike (Ritchie &
Kolodinsky, 2003; Rojas, 2000), but these topics also defy measurement in a way few variables
do (Herman & Renz, 1998; Sawhill & Williamson, 2001), which has led some scholars to
wonder if the task of measuring NFP performance is even possible (Sawhill & Williamson,
2001).
Clearly, one of the main challenges of assessing NFP effectiveness is that the “simple
elegance of a financial measure” (Kaplan, 2001: 354) of organizational performance is not
applicable. Common accounting-based ratio measures employed in traditional strategy literature
such as return on assets (ROA), return on investment (ROI), return on sales (ROS), as well as
market-based measures such as Tobin’s Q and market capitalization are all irrelevant within an
NFP context. In response to these challenges, models have emerged in an attempt to measure
organizational effectiveness rather than performance (Balser & McClusky, 2005; Herman &
Renz, 1998; Kushner & Poole, 1996; Rojas, 2000).
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Rather than attempt to measure NFP performance using traditional financial measures
typically seen in strategy literature, other measures of organizational effectiveness have been
proposed (Cameron, 1986), and the ultimate choice of measure is driven by the organization’s
idiosyncratic goals and mission (Herman & Renz, 1998). One shortcoming of this approach is
that organizations can rate themselves and benchmark their own efforts against their stated goals,
but outsiders unfamiliar with the terminology of a particular NFP cannot easily compare
different organizations.
When case studies are used to focus on one particular organization’s attempt at defining
measureable goals, researchers report dozens of metrics that organizations use to track their
performance, few of which may be applicable to another organization (Sawhill & Williamson,
2001). For example, the leadership at The Nature Conservancy spent one year developing a list
of ninety-eight performance indicators. While some measures were generic enough to permit
comparison to other organizations (e.g., dollars raised per capita, percentage of operating budget
spent on fundraising), many others were Conservancy-specific (e.g., number of acres acquired
for protection). Unfortunately, these contextually-specific measures can lead to “even greater
fractioning of knowledge and incommensurability of theories and findings,” (Herman & Renz,
1999: 122).
Other methods that have attempted to introduce more rigorous and generalizable
performance measurement to the NFP sector include the balanced scorecard (Kaplan, 2001),
which focuses on different stakeholder metrics such as customer needs, organizational learning
and growth, economic value, and internal organizational processes. The competing values
framework (CVF) (Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1983; Quinn & Spreitzer, 1991) uses multi-dimensional
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scaling to map values into a 2x2 matrix of different effectiveness models based on organizational
goals and resulted in four possible models: human relations, internal process, open systems, and
rational goals. Each model has its own underlying values for rating organizational effectiveness.
Bhargava and Sinha (1992) use a four-factor model to predict organizational effectiveness.
Seven-point Likert-type scales assess the level of production, leadership, interpersonal conflict,
and commitment within the organization. Taken together, these components represent an
individual’s perception of how effective an organization is in its performance of its stated
mission. The multiple constituency model assumes that various organizational stakeholders
(Freeman, 1983) all desire different outcomes from the organization and the extent to which
NFPs can meet these various dimensions will influence stakeholder perceptions of effectiveness
(Zammuto, 1984). This model is adequate for case study research and offers the ability to focus
on one particular organization’s determination of its own level of effectiveness. For larger-scale
empirical work that generalizes across contexts, a common measure of organizational
effectiveness is required for comparisons within and between groups of NFPs.
More recent research on NFP performance measurement has addressed this issue by
developing financial measures of NFP performance that are comparable across contexts. The use
of measures based on common data such as IRS filings permits cross-context comparison, longterm benchmarking, and a common vocabulary for organizational researchers (Ritchie &
Kolodinsky, 2003). By developing ratios related to fundraising expenses, executive
compensation, and growth potential, donors can compare organizations across a common set of
metrics. With these types of measures, NFP researchers, donors, and managers can begin to
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incorporate financial measurement terminology into their strategic plans as easily as for-profit
managers incorporate terms such as “return on assets” and “return on sales.”
The Rise of Not-for-profit Watchdog Organizations
Assessing NFP effectiveness has been mired in a lack of transparency and objectivity
(Szper & Prakash, 2011) and, because the direct social impact of any particular program is
difficult to measure, NFP stakeholders can experience difficulty ascertaining how efficiently
resources are being used, the organization’s prospects for growth, and the appropriate level of
executive compensation. In the absence of traditional market-based measures of organizational
effectiveness (Kaplan, 2001), third-party organizations have emerged to parse financial and
perceptual data from NFPs into usable effectiveness metrics for consumption by various
stakeholders, including donors, volunteers, board members, and funding agencies (Szper &
Prakash, 2011). These metrics are comparable across different organizations and permit easy
comparisons of NFPs. The overall aim of NFP watchdog organizations is to provide stakeholders
with information about how organizations are performing relative to other organizations within
the same scope of operations. Watchdog organizations that issue ratings based on financial
metrics typically rely on the data contained in IRS filings that all 501(c)(3) NFPs are required to
file. Form 990 financial information is a commonly used and widely-accepted data source for
NFP research (Herman & Renz, 1998; Herman, Renz, & Heimovics, 1996; Hwang & Powell,
2009; Ritchie & Kolodinsky, 2003). These organizations then interpret the IRS forms, analyze
the operational data, and report it back to donors, board members, community leaders, and
volunteers in a standardized, comparable format that is easier to understand. The purpose of
these ratings is similar to those of creditworthiness ratings assessed by companies such as
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Standard and Poor’s or Moody’s, where the overall goal of the rating agency is to provide
analysis and guidance from industry experts so that donors, volunteers, boards, and executives
can make more informed decisions. By improving the transparency of NFP operations through
the dissemination of financial data and subsequent ratings, watchdog organizations attempt to
influence donor and NFP behavior (Szper & Prakash, 2011). One of the largest and oldest NFP
watchdog is CN—the primary data source for this study.
Description of Charity Navigator
Founded in 2001, CN is a 501(c)(3) NFP itself and one of many watchdog organizations
that have emerged in recent years as a way to add transparency to the NFP arena (Szper &
Prakash, 2011). As of 2012, CN provided ratings on more than 5,500 NFPs. NFPs are
categorized into one of nine broad categories (e.g., human services, animals, health) and then
further subcategorized into one of thirty-four narrower causes (e.g., food banks, wildlife
conservation, medical research) based on the activity code reported to the IRS on the 990 form.
In order to be included within the CN database, NFPs must be classified as a 501(c)(3)
organization and file a 990 form. CN requires that organizations have at least four years of 990
forms on file. Organizations must be based in the United States, but may perform work
internationally as part of their mission. Public support must exceed $500,000 and total
contributions must equal a minimum of $1,000,000 in the latest year of Form 990 filings. From
these inclusion criteria, CN rates approximately 6% of NFPs within the United States. Upon
receipt of the publicly-available 990 form data, CN presents it in a way that is uniform,
comparable, and more accessible to donors and other NFP stakeholders. Donors, managers,
board members, and other stakeholders can then use these ratings as a benchmarking metric to
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compare across NFPs. Figure 2 presents an example of a CN ratings report. CN focuses on rating
growth potential and efficient operations for NFPs, but stops short of relating these two
constructs to a meaningful performance outcome.
Based on its history of presenting publicly-available financial data for the purposes of
influencing NFP and stakeholder behavior (Tinkelman, 2009), as well as its accepted use in other
empirical studies of NFPs (Andreoni & Payne, 2011; Gordon, Knock, & Neely, 2009; Seo, Kim,
& Yang, 2009; Szper & Prakash, 2011), CN permits data for evaluating the ambidexterity
hypothesis (Simsek et al., 2009) within a NFP context. Prior studies that have used CN data have
either looked at NFPs in one state (Szper & Prakash, 2011) or one particular industry (Seo et al.,
2009). This is the first study to take a broad look across the entire dataset to examine patterns of
ambidextrous operations and their relationship to fiscal performance within NFPs. This large
sample that encompasses various causes allows for the examination of the relationship between
these two concepts and their relationship to an organization’s financial performance.
Study 1 Methods and Context
For the quantitative portion of this study, data were collected from the CN database
during February and March of 2011, reflecting the most current ratings on file for each of the
NFPs in the database. These data report financial filings for fiscal year 2010 and prior. Although
CN makes the 990 form data available on their website, these data are not presented in a way that
makes comparison or analysis straight-forward. The inability to download the CN dataset in its
entirety necessitated use of the Visual Web Ripper (sequentum.com) data extraction program.
Visual Web Ripper extracts data from user-selected portions of web pages and organizes the
output into spreadsheets for the purposes of conducting additional statistical analyses. Figure 3
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contains an image of the Visual Web Ripper tool and highlights to portions of the webpage that
for inclusion in a spreadsheet for the purposes of statistical analysis.
Research Design and Quantitative Analytic Techniques
This research seeks to understand the phenomenon of ambidexterity within a sample of
NFP organizations by examining the CN dataset for patterns related to the OA and to identify the
impact on ambidextrous operations on financial performance.
Study 1 Variables and Description of Measures
CN calculates ratings for NFPs from by analyzing official IRS Form 990 data and parsing
the financial data into meaningful comparisons. The two financial measures, organizational
efficiency and organizational capacity, approximate the competing pressures first laid out by
March (1991) and further refined by contemporary scholars who continue to use the language of
exploration and exploitation in their studies of OA (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008; Raisch,
Birkinshaw, Probst, & Tushman, 2009; Simsek et al., 2009).
Organizational Efficiency (Exploitation)
The first independent variable, exploitation, is described by March as activities such as
“refinement, efficiency, selection, and implementation” (March, 1991: 102, emphasis added), and
is measured by CN’s rating of organizational efficiency (OE). OE is one of the two major areas
rated by CN. According to CN, “analyzing a charity’s efficiency reveals how well it functions
day to day. Charities that are efficient spend less money to raise more. They devote the majority
of their spending to the programs and services they exist to provide” (charitynavigator.org). OE
demonstrates a high degree of theoretical correspondence with the concept of exploitation
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(March, 1991) in that it attempts to measure the degree to which contributions are being
efficiently applied to the organization’s ongoing operations within the stated mission.
OE is determined by four underlying financial ratios: program expenses, administrative
expenses, fundraising expenses, and fundraising efficiency. A rating for program expenses is
calculated by dividing direct program expenses by total functional expenses (the sum of a
charity’s program expenses, administrative expenses and fundraising expenses) to determine a
percentage. Higher percentages are rated more favorably by CN. A rating for administrative
expenses is calculated by dividing administrative expenses (executive compensation and other
staff salaries) by total functional expenses. For this measure, lower percentages are rated more
favorably by CN.A rating for fundraising expenses is calculated by dividing an organization’s
fundraising expenses by its total functional expenses. For this measure, lower percentages are
rated more favorably by CN. A rating for fundraising efficiency is calculated by dividing an
NFP’s fundraising expenses by its total contributions. For this measure, lower percentages are
rated more favorably by CN.
Each of these four categories is worth 10 possible points. The sum of the ratings from
these four sub-categories results in overall OE ratings that range from 0-40 points. In cases
where an NFP spends less than 33% of their total budget on program expenses, CN automatically
gives these organizations a zero (0) for organizational efficiency. This portion of the rating
methodology shows the bias towards organizations who are not operating at the peak of
efficiency, although such levels of efficiency may actually be detrimental to overall effectiveness
(Adler, 1999; Benner & Tushman, 2003).
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Organizational Capacity (Exploration)
The second major area that CN rates is organizational capacity (OC). March
conceptualizes exploration as “search, variation, experimentation, and discovery,” (1991: 102)
and the OC rating accurately taps this future-oriented posture by defining OC as “how well a
charity is positioned to pursue long-term systematic change. They have the financial flexibility to
plan strategically and pursue long-term objectives. These charities can more ambitiously address
our nation’s challenges, envisioning and working toward long-term solutions”
(charitynavigator.org, emphasis added). Higher OC ratings indicate an ability to “continue
pursuing change in the future and will generate both short-term and long-term results for every
dollar they receive from givers.”
OC is determined by calculating the four-year average of two financial ratios: primary
revenue growth, primary expenses growth, plus an assessment of an NFP’s working capital ratio.
Primary revenue growth includes donor-based contributions, corporate donations, and grants.
Growing these revenue streams over time demonstrates that NFPs are maintaining support for
their programs and will continue to operate in the future. Primary expenses growth demonstrates
that programs are reaching a larger audience, continuing to fulfill a need, and developing new
programs as needed. The methods for rating primary revenue growth and primary expenses
growth are the same: these growth rates are calculated by computing the annualized growth rate
for both measures is [(Yn/Y0)(1/n)]-1 where Y0 is the value measured in the first year of the
interval and n is the length of the interval in years. CN uses proprietary conversion tables to
translate the calculated growth rates into ratings for this aspect of OC. The ratings indicate how
close an NFP is to industry standards and how it compares with the other charities in the dataset.
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For these measures, higher percentages are rated more favorably by CN and NFPs may earn up
to 10 points for each category.
A rating for working capital ratio is calculated by dividing working capital by total
expenses. Working capital assets include cash, savings, accounts receivables, grants receivable,
pledges receivable, and investments in securities. Liabilities include accounts payables, accrued
expenses, and grants payable. This measure provides an estimate of how long an NFP could
continue to engage in operations without generating any new revenue. NFPs may earn up to 10
points for their working capital ratio and similar to the measures of primary revenue growth and
primary expenses growth, CN converts the raw working capital ratio to a rating using
proprietary, industry-specific ratings tables. The sum of these three sub-categories results in
overall OC ratings that range from 0-30 points.
Controlling for Industry Differences
After determining the raw percentages for each dimension of OE and OC, CN applies an
industry-specific algorithm to convert the four measures into one rating. To permit cross-industry
comparison, ratings are adjusted to reflect industry norms. For example, in the food banking
industry, in order to receive the highest possible rating for the administrative expenses
subcategory of OE, a food bank must keep their administrative expenses between 0% and 3% of
total functional expense (the sum of a charity’s program expenses, administrative expenses and
fundraising expenses). Thus, for a food bank with total functional expenses of $1,000,000, staff
salaries must remain below $30,000 in order to earn the full 10 points for this rating; however, a
museum must may report administrative expenses up to 17.5% and still receive the highest rating
for this portion from CN. Although an administrative expense rating of 15% would yield a food
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bank 0 points from CN for this measure, a museum with the same expense ratio would receive
the full 10 points possible for this measure. These types of industry-adjusted ratings allow for
comparisons between NFPs within the same industry as well as NFPs across diverse industries.
Creating a Measure of Organizational Ambidexterity
Consistent with prior OA research (Atuahene-Gima, 2005; Katila & Ahuja, 2002), the
measures for OC and OE are multiplied to create a measure of OA. By conceptualizing these as
orthogonal constructs rather than trade-offs, it is possible for an organizational to engage in high
levels of both exploration and exploitation. The range of possible ratings is from 0-40 for OE and
0-30 for OC and the product of these two measures ranges from 0 to 1200.
Across the entire dataset, the mean score for exploration was 16.17 on a scale from 0 to
30 and the mean score for exploitation was 35.39 on a scale from 0 to 40. This mean split
resulted in 1,054 to 1,975 NFPs per quadrant. By categorizing organizations into quadrants based
on these mean-split values, it is possible to compare the average level of fiscal performance
between the NFPs that inhabit the different quadrants. This classification yields an understanding
of how many organizations out of the total sample exhibit ambidextrous behavior. If the sample
were normally distributed, each quadrant would contain approximately 1,300 NFPs; however,
given the difficulty of achieving ambidexterity reported in the literature (Adler et al., 2009;
Benner & Tushman, 2003), it is surprising that so many NFPs within the CN dataset can be
classified as ambidextrous organizations. Table 2 presents a partial correlation matrix with
descriptive statistics for the variables of interest. Table 3 presents a full correlation matrix
including the industries in the CN dataset. Table 4 presents a description of the sectors and
industries rated by CN.
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Fiscal Performance
The dependent variable in this study is fiscal performance (FP), a ratio measure derived
from IRS Form 990 data and calculated as an NFP’s total revenue (line 12) divided by total
expenses (line 17). The resulting ratio represents an NFP operating at a state of surplus or deficit;
an FP greater than 1.0 represents a state of surplus and an FP less than 1.0 represents a state of
deficit. For NFPs, a state of surplus is highly desirable for a number of reasons, including
providing a buffer against environmental shocks (Bowman, 2011) as well as allowing for the
accumulation of funds to pursue new growth initiatives in future years (Bowman, Tuckman, &
Young, 2010). Public charities such as the ones represented in the CN dataset may carry as large
of a surplus as they like (Fremont-Smith, 2004).
Unlike the CN ratings, this ratio is not adjusted for industry differences. Through the
process of factor analysis, researchers have found that FP is conceptually and statistically distinct
from other measures of organizational performance, such as fundraising efficiency or public
support (Ritchie & Kolodinsky, 2003). Other studies of NFP performance have also used FP
(Siciliano, 1996; 1997) because it provides a comparable measure of financial performance
across NFPs beyond idiosyncratic performance measures.
Control Variables
This study includes relevant controls in order to limit the influence of potential
confounds. As organizations age and grow, they tend to exhibit greater levels of structure, rather
than flexibility (Sørensen & Stuart, 2000); hence, I have controlled for both of these possible
confounding variables in order to limit their influence on the outcomes of this study. Firm age
influences the impact of simultaneous and sequential ambidexterity on organizational
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performance (Venkatraman et al., 2007). Organizational size has also been found to moderate the
relationship between exploration and the development of new products (Rothaermel & Deeds,
2004). Consistent with other strategic management research at the organizational level of
analysis, organizational size is operationalized as the NFP’s net assets (Russo, 1992), taken from
the fiscal year’s income statement. Each organization provides its founding date in the CN
database, so organizational age is calculated as the number of years since the organization’s
founding. CN reports data that span nine broad categories and thirty-four different causes, which
essentially represent different “industries” within the NFP sector. Cost structures can vary widely
across different categories and some categories may also be overrepresented within the database
(charitynavigator.org), so I have controlled for the different industries in the CN dataset to
prevent the likelihood of confounding noise across different segments and mission types.
Validity
Validity refers to the establishment of evidence that a measure depicts the intended
construct (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000). Although there are many types and conceptualizations of
validity (Schriesheim, Cogliser, Scandura, Lankau, & Powers, 1999), two are of particular
importance to the present study. First, content validity refers to the representativeness of the
content contained in the instrument. The two independent variable measures—OC and OE—
closely relate to the two ambidexterity concepts proposed by March (1991): exploration and
exploitation. Second, external construct validity refers to whether the findings from the sample
are generalizable to a larger context (Messick, 1988). Based on the large sample size, which is
more than five times greater than the next largest empirical ambidexterity study (Venkatraman et
al., 2007) as well as the inclusion of all reported “industries” within the largest NFP rating
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organization in the sector, it is likely that the results derived from this study will demonstrate a
high degree of external construct validity, i.e., generalizability. The inclusion of a full correlation
matrix (see Table 3) that depicts the strength of relationships between all variables within a study
may also contribute to the evidence of validity (Crook, Shook, Morris, & Madden, 2010).
Study 2 Methods and Context
In order to address the second research question of this dissertation, “How do NPFs
manage ambidextrous operations?” I selected four sites from the CN dataset of 108 possible food
banks. All of the food banks are affiliates of the Feeding America national network and are
located in the Southeast United States. I conducted site visits and semi-structured interviews with
executive directors and other senior members of the leadership team. Three of the four food
banks rate highly on both CN ratings for efficiency and capacity, which makes them an excellent
research setting to begin to understand how these types of organizations are able to deliver their
services efficiently while also seeking new programs, sources of funding, sources of food, and
donors. The fourth is very high on exploitation and moderately high on exploration. Figure 4
presents a scatter plot of the four food banks analyzed for this study and presents their relative
positions in the 2x2 matrix of exploration and exploitation.
The operational context for food banks has recently shifted in a dramatic way (Etter &
Jargon, 2007). From the grass-roots beginnings of the first food banks in the 1970s, modern food
banks are large, professionally-managed organizations responsible for covering every county in
the United States. In 1979, the independent food banks created a national organization to handle
fundraising, advocacy, and partnerships at the national level. This structure is different from a
case of a headquarters spawning smaller local subsidiaries; rather, in this case, the local
41

subsidiaries decided to form a national headquarters. The mission-based operational focus of
food banks suggests that they would have difficulty innovating beyond their core mission of
providing food to hungry individuals. Food banks within this network are called affiliates and
each food bank is given a service area consisting of a set number of counties. Affiliates are not
permitted to solicit donations of food or money from donors outside their service area, nor are
they able to expand their offerings into counties served by other affiliates in the network. As
sources of food have shifted from large-scale corporate donations to purchased food, food banks
have needed to find additional sources of food to distribute (Etter & Jargon, 2007). Food banks
have also come to rely more heavily on private donations in the face of shrinking federal and
state funding. All of these new demands require that food banks be resourceful in terms of
finding new sources of healthy food and new donors to fund programs. These two needs—
purchasing more food on the open market and searching for new sources of funding—also come
at a time when food banks and donors are looking beyond the raw number of pounds distributed
to the community to determine the nutritional make-up of the food as well. Rising rates of
childhood obesity and diabetes have pushed food banks to see themselves as a source of food as
well as a source of good nutrition.
The additional logistical issues of storing and distributing refrigerated foods such as milk
and meat, along with fast-spoiling foods such as bread and vegetables, pose challenges for food
banks. These warehouses have not always been equipped to deal with tractor-trailer loads of
frozen food, deliveries of fruit that will spoil within days, or bread that must be handled and
stored without being damaged. These changing dynamics are not yet reflected in the CN dataset
since their description of the food banking industry states, “As primarily non-cash operations,
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these charities demonstrate very little need for spending on overhead. Their median
administrative expenses fall below the median for all of the charities we rate.” Furthermore,
“Because the bulk of their expenses take the form of donated food and goods, these charities
need only small amounts of working capital” (charitnavigator.org). To compensate for this
deficiency in the quantitative data, I conducted site visits at four food banks to interview
executive directors and other members of their leadership team to determine the mechanisms by
which food banks are engaging in ambidextrous operations.
Study 2 Data Collection
Prior to conducting interviews with the food bank top managers, I submitted a request to
the Institutional Review Board (IRB) to obtain permission from the board to conduct interviews.
Figure 5 shows the approval letter required to conduct human subjects research and Figure 6
shows the informed consent sheet that each participant signed, indicating their willingness to
participate in the present study and their right to end participation at any time.
Following this approval process, I interviewed, at a minimum, the executive director for
each of the four food banks selected for the study. Where possible, I also interviewed other
members of the senior leadership teams, including CFOs and vice presidents. Interviews ranged
from 30 to 60 minutes in length. Some interviews were conducted in office settings while others
were conducted during walking tours of the food bank facilities. Interviews followed a semistructured format that began with probing questions about employees’ experience and
background prior to becoming leaders in the food bank organization. Following these
introductory questions, I asked about theoretically-relevant topics related to OA such as growth,
change, organizational turning points, efficiency, and ratings agencies such as CN. I asked the
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top managers to describe at least one successful growth initiative, one unsuccessful growth
initiative, and how their organization interacts with other types of organizations. Figure 7
presents the interview protocol used to guide the questions. To protect the identity of the
respondents, the names and locations of the food banks have been altered:
Central is regarded as the innovator of the group by other affiliates. Central serves the
largest population of clients and they also have the deepest pockets. All three of the other
executive directors were impressed by what the staff at Central has accomplished. Central’s FP is
1.03.
Riverside also moved from an urban location to a suburban location. Unlike many of the
other food banks, they require individuals to come to the food bank in person to pick up food.
Riverside’s FP is 1.03.
Wright has exceeded warehouse capacity and their lack of available space is causing
problems with efficiency. They are planning a move to a new space to accommodate the growing
demand in their service area. Wright’s FP is 1.04.
Orange recently completed a move to a larger warehouse. After outgrowing their
previous space, they relocated to a corporate park in a different county from their previous
location. Orange is the only food bank in the sample that is not fully located in Quadrant 4 of
Figure 1. With exploration scores of 15.65 and exploitation scores of 36.68, Orange has similar
CN ratings to the other three and the interviews at this site reflected themes similar to those
described at the other sites. Due to this similarity, Orange remains included in the study.
Orange’s FP is 0.99.
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Following best practices set forth by Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988), all interviews
were transcribed within 24 hours. I kept a notebook during the site visits in order to record my
first impressions of the facilities, the people I met with, and other thoughts that were not captured
by the digital audio recorder. Where possible, I requested permission to take pictures of the
facilities and their operations. In addition to the audio recorder, I took notes throughout the
interviews and site tours to record my impressions regarding what I was seeing and hearing from
the NFP managers. All interviews were transcribed using a professional transcription service and
checked within twenty-four hours of receipt of each transcription to ensure consistency and to fill
in any words or gaps that the transcriptionist was unable to interpret from the audio recording.
After all of the interviews were transcribed, they were entered into a text analysis
program, QDA Miner (provalis.com), to facilitate the isolation and identification of common
themes across the interviews. Each interview was coded for broad themes related to processes in
place at the food banks that may contribute to ambidextrous operations and then re-analyzed to
look for more detailed themes under each process. Because participants often discussed other
issues that related tangentially to core ambidexterity concepts, I also looked for themes that were
not expressly in the interview protocol that might offer new theoretical insight to the
ambidexterity literature. The main themes that emerged are presented in the following chapter.
Research Methods Summary
This chapter has provided an overview of the present study, its analytical approaches, and
the measures used to test the hypothesized relationships between the variables of interest for the
quantitative portion of the dissertation. This chapter also described the procedure for receiving
permission to conduct human subjects research, the sample of food banks used in the qualitative
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portion, the interview and transcription process, and the method of analysis used to identify the
major themes seen in the interviews. The following chapter presents the results of the two
studies.
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Chapter 4 – Results
Study 1: Organizational Ambidexterity and Financial Performance
This chapter presents the quantitative results of this study. The STATA IC version 11
statistics package was used for the mean-comparison ANOVA and clustered regression analysis.
Hypothesis test results are reported in the following tables: Table 5 presents the results from the
ANOVA test that compares the fiscal performance scores for organizations at high and low
levels of exploration and exploitation. Table 6 presents the results of the clustered multiple
regression that tests the overall impact of OA on fiscal performance from the overall CN dataset.
Form 990 data reflects the operations of the organization itself; thus, the unit of analysis for this
research project is the NFP. All of the NFPs in the dataset are “nested” within larger sectors,
requiring clustered robust regression for hypothesis testing. Organizations within the same cause
and category are likely to share other characteristics and clustered regression accounts for
potential non-independence between organizations by employing robust standard errors. Rather
than use sums of squares to estimate an overall F statistic for the model, clustered regression
uses a Wald test to estimate an F statistic. For clustered regression, the r-squared statistic is
equivalent to an adjusted r-squared statistic so only the r-squared statistic is reported in Table 6.
Fiscal performance scores have been scaled up by a factor of 100 to facilitate interpretation of
regression output as a percentage of deficit or surplus.
A caveat of this study is that the quantitative results should be interpreted with caution.
Despite calls in the NFP performance assessment literature to use measures that are comparable
across organizations (Herman and Renz, 1998; Rojas, 2000), the use of IRS-reported financial
indicators as proxies for the independent variables of this study—OC, OE, and OA—and the
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dependent variable—FP—resulted in a high degree of multicollinearity between the predictor
and outcome variables. In addition to the issue of multicollinearity, FP was not normally
distributed across the CN sample. The combination of non-normality for the dependent variable
as well as the multicollinearity between the financial variables suggests that although the results
of the multiple regression analysis reported may provide some guidance for researchers and
managers, the true relationships between the constructs of interest may vary from those presented
here. Until additional NFP-appropriate measures are developed and widely adopted, it is likely
that successful attempts to assess NFP activities and outcomes quantitatively will remain elusive
(Sawhill and Williamson, 2001).
Results of Hypothesis Tests
The overall mean fiscal performance score for the CN dataset was 1.01, indicating that,
on average, the organizations were operating at a slight (1%) surplus over their expenses. To test
Hypotheses 1 and 2, organizations were grouped into four quadrants based on the mean scores
for exploration and exploitation. Table 5 presents the mean FP values per cell based on a mean
split of exploration and exploitation, the number of NFPs per cell, the FP difference between
each cell and the significance level of these differences. All four mean cell values for fiscal
performance differed significantly (p < .05) from the overall mean of 1.01. Each of the cell
means also differed significantly from each other (p < .05) with the exceptions of quadrants 3
and 4, which were not significantly different from each other. This table forms the basis for
testing hypotheses H1a, H1b, H1a’, H1b’, and H2.
Consistent with the traditional concept of ambidexterity from the organizational learning
literature (March, 1991), the following hypotheses were proposed to suggest that organizations
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that attempt to simultaneously engage in high levels of both actions may be at a disadvantage
relative to organizations that attempt to specialize in either exploration or exploitation.
Hypothesis 1 offered the general hypothesis that focused organizations would outperform
ambidextrous organizations, with more specific hypotheses for each condition.
Hypothesis H1a suggests that exploitation-focused organizations will outperform
ambidextrous organizations. Specifically:
H1a: Exploitation-focused organizations within Figure 1 (Quadrant 2)
will experience greater financial performance than organizations that
attempt an ambidextrous strategy (Quadrant 4).
Table 5 illustrates that ambidextrous firms (i.e., quadrant 4) report an average FP of 1.08. This
performance score is significantly different from the average FP of .95 reported by exploitationfocused organizations (i.e., quadrant 2); thus, H1a is not supported.
Hypothesis H1b suggests that exploration-focused organizations will outperform
ambidextrous organizations. Specifically:
H1b: Exploration-focused organizations within Figure 1 (Quadrant 3) will
experience greater financial performance than organizations that attempt
an ambidextrous strategy (Quadrant 4).
Table 5 illustrates that ambidextrous firms (i.e. quadrant 4) report an average FP of 1.08.
This performance score is not significantly different from the average FP of 1.05 reported by
exploration-focused organizations (i.e. quadrant 3); thus, H1b is not supported.
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In addition to these hypotheses, two alternates were also proposed: H1’ suggested that
ambidextrous organizations would outperform focused organizations. Specifically, H1a’
proposed:
H1a’: Ambidextrous organizations within Figure 1 (Quadrant 4) will
experience greater financial performance than organizations that attempt
an exploitation focus (Quadrant 2).
Table 5 illustrates that ambidextrous firms (i.e. quadrant 4) report an average FP of 1.08.
This performance score is significantly higher than the average FP of .95 reported by
exploitation-focused organizations (i.e. quadrant 3); thus, H1a’ is supported.
Specifically, H1b’ also proposed:
H1b’: Ambidextrous organizations within Figure 1 (Quadrant 4) will
experience greater financial performance than organizations that attempt
an exploration focus (Quadrant 3).
Table 5 illustrates that ambidextrous firms (i.e. quadrant 4) report an average FP of 1.08.
This performance score is not significantly higher than the average FP of 1.05 reported by
exploration-focused organizations (i.e. quadrant 3); thus, H1b’ is not supported.
The second main hypothesis considered the case of NFPs that were rated as low on both
dimensions to determine the relationship between these factors and FP. The original hypothesis
suggested:
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H2: Organizations with equally low levels of exploration and exploitation
(Quadrant 1) will experience the lowest financial performance.
Table 5 illustrates that firms with low exploration and exploitation scores (i.e. quadrant
1) report an average FP of .90. This performance score is significantly lower than the average FP
of the entire dataset (1.01), and is also significantly lower than the average FP of the other three
quadrants; thus, H2 is supported.
Finally, clustered regression was used to assess the overall impact of ambidextrous
operations on fiscal performance and evaluate Hypothesis 3.
H3: Organizational ambidexterity will have a significant, positive effect on
financial performance.
Table 6 presents the clustered regression output with robust standard errors. Prior to this
test, all outliers were removed in order to eliminate their influence on the results. The sample
size reported is reduced due to lack of data recorded data either of on the control variables, age
or size, leaving the final sample for clustered regression analysis at 3,935 NFPs. From this test,
the relationship between exploration and FP was significant, but exploitation was nonsignificant. OA was also non-significantly related to FP, and the negative sign indicates that
ambidexterity may actually be detrimental to FP. From these results, H3 was not supported.
Robustness Checks
To assess the robustness of these analysis from potential points of influence or outliers, I
also conducted the ANOVA and regression analyses with all cases dropped that reported a zero
(0) score for either exploration or exploitation, which would have yielded a zero (0) score for
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ambidexterity. Dropping these seventy-four cases had no effect on the overall results in post-hoc
checks, and did not change the degree of support for any of the hypotheses; consequently, these
cases were included in the final analyses to leave the dataset intact.
A second robustness check for the possible influence from cases with zeros with
exploration or exploitation was to adjust these scores from 0 to 1 in order to minimize the impact
of a zero for an ambidexterity score. After making these 74 adjustments, the ANOVA and
regression analyses were repeated, but this change had no effect on the overall results, nor did it
change the degree of support for any of the hypotheses.
Industry-specific Results
Although no specific hypotheses were offered regarding the impact of industry
differences that may influence the relationship between OA and FP, a post-hoc ANCOVA test
indicated significant differences based on the range of industries present in the CN dataset. The
ANCOVA to ascertain the presence of between-group differences resulted in an overall model F
of 6.14, indicating that levels of FP varied by industry and an adjusted r-squared of .05,
indicating that OC, OE, OA, organizational age, and organizational size accounted for
approximately 5% of the variance in FP. In addition to the ANCOVA test, a regression model
with all 34 industries included as dummy variables was also evaluated. The first block of control
variables (industry, organizational age, and organizational size) resulted in an adjusted r-squared
of .02. The inclusion of OE, OC, and OA in a second block of variables increased the adjusted rsquared for the full model to .05 for a change in r-squared of .03. Table 7 presents the OLS
regression results for the six industries where exploration, exploitation, or ambidexterity have a
significant impact on fiscal performance: animal rights, private elementary and secondary
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schools, private universities, food banks, international development, and fundraising. These
industries cover a broad swath of institutional missions, and it is especially puzzling that
although ambidexterity has a significant positive effect on fiscal performance for one industry
(private elementary schools), it actually has a negative impact on fiscal performance for the
others. These findings will be discussed in detail in chapter five. These results provide some
answers to the first research question; specifically, what is the impact of OA on organizational
performance. A qualitative approach allows for insights into the underlying processes in use in a
sample of ambidextrous organizations. The results from the qualitative portion of the dissertation
follow.
Study 2: Processes for Managing Ambidexterity
Although the role of watchdog organizations was expected to be a major part of the
discussion, most of the executive directors glossed over the topic. Rather than changing
organizational goals and programs to maximize specific ratings from organizations such as CN,
they were more interested in operating at their peak performance and allowing the ratings to fall
where they may. When asked about whether or not the managers at the food bank are concerned
about ratings from CN, the executive director from Orange remarked,
“I don’t pay too much attention to it really. We are required to be
audited every year, we are required to file a 990 every year, so we
meet on those obligations and that is public data. So as long as we
are doing our fiscal accountability they really don’t bother us much
at all.”
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The desire to earn high ratings from CN did not appear to be a catalyst for growth and
efficiency, but the inductive analysis of the interviews revealed three main processes that enabled
food banks to engage in exploration and exploitation as a way to remain competitive. All of the
executive directors, and many of the vice presidents, indicated that the field had changed in a
number of ways over the past decade. The executive director of Central commented,
“Food banking was created to take that waste from food industry
and make sure that it didn’t get thrown in the Dumpster and make
sure that it fed hungry people.”
From this shared beginning, all four of the executive directors noted that successful,
modern food banks are now essentially operated as businesses. The executive director at Central
remarked,
“Non-profits have changed from being what we might call just a
‘do-gooder’ organization in that they have to run it just like any
other business because you have to have a cash reserve in order to
be able to continue funding your program during the good years
and the bad years. Having a cash reserve or having a cash surplus
at year-end is a positive thing and that’s where foundations are
looking.”
Likewise, one of the vice presidents at Wright commented,
“I would say food banking [has] become a pretty fine-tuned
business kind of operation”
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The managers in this study all anticipated the need for organizational change before the
changing situation became a major crisis. Although all of the executive directors described a
dynamic environment characterized by declining support, none indicated that this would present
a challenge that could result in the dissolution of their food bank or network. By proactively
developing responses to changing situations, executive directors have been able to stay ahead of
the curve, even when that has led to decisions that may be locally unpopular. The executive
director of Orange remarked,
“When we announced we were moving to [this county], people
thought we were leaving them. But we had to move if we wanted
to keep doing what we were doing without changing our mission.”
By moving to a larger space with the capacity for refrigerated storage, the food bank was
able to adapt to changing demand patterns and calls for increased nutritional requirements
without having to sacrifice its ability to meet the needs of its recipients.
The ability to balance the tension inherent in exploration and exploitation appears to have
come from three main processes: managing knowledge, retaining professional talent, and
enabling leadership. Each of the executive directors talked about all three processes in use at
their food bank. The unique finding from this inductive study is that food banks used the same
three processes simultaneously to explore for new programs and funding sources, as well as to
exploit existing resources for program refinements. Table 8 provides examples of the different
processes and quotes to illustrate how each process allowed the food banks to operate
ambidextrously within their local community and across a larger national network. Executive
directors at all four sites discussed these processes and sub-processes.
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Managing Knowledge
The first process that emerged from analyzing the interviews was the collaborative nature
of affiliates within the network. They shared ideas for new projects and refinements to existing
projects through two major channels: an annual conference organized by Feeding America and
ongoing interactions with staff and executive directors at other affiliates. Each of these two
processes, knowledge coordinated through national meetings and knowledge shared through
networks of local affiliates, permitted food banks to more effectively explore for new programs
and exploit existing programs and facilitated ambidextrous operations.
Coordinating Best Practices
The four food bank sites in this study are affiliates of the Feeding America network. In
exchange for annual dues of $6,000, each affiliate is able to access the resources and connections
at the national headquarters. One of the main resources the executive directors described is an
annual conference organized by the Feeding America headquarters. At this meeting, food banks
are presented with awards based on their performance and innovative new strategies for meeting
Feeding America’s mission are showcased. The executive director of Riverside described:
“You know you go to conferences, they highlight something and
you think, ‘Well that might work for us’ and you bring it back.”
Some of these innovative programs start from distant sites, such as New Mexico, and
through the national network end up making into the local service area for food banks. As the
executive director at Orange explained,
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“I said to the board, ‘You know that backpack program's working
in New Mexico and we have five thousand dollars in [this county].
Would you give me permission to try the backpack program in
[this county] and if it doesn't work, it won't?’”
From this beginning as an innovative new program for Orange, they were able to take the
backpack program, refine it locally, and eventually be recognized by the Feeding America
headquarters as a food bank with a backpack program worth emulating. The executive director of
Orange described their role as an identified success story at the national conference for other
managers:
“Our network has Food Bank of the Year awards and recognitions
so we all apply. Now we’re recognized for our backpack program
because we are the third largest backpack program in the country.”
In this case, the national meeting provides new ideas for programs and facilitates the
cross-pollination of best practices between different food banks. For Orange, the children’s
backpack program was started after hearing about its use in New Mexico. The executive director
brought the idea back to her affiliate, asked for funding from the board, and began replicating the
program locally. Once the Feeding America headquarters identifies exemplary affiliates, they
may ask them to mentor other food banks as a way to help a novice affiliate quickly learn how to
operate a new program without having to start with a completely blank slate. The executive
director at Orange will work with a manager from another affiliate to teach them how to start up
a successful backpack program:
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So Chicago just contacted us, “Will you mentor a new food bank
employee that’s running their backpack program?”
Because of this national coordination, innovative programs and best practices are
distributed through the network and executive directors can learn from the most effective
programs in the country. The opportunity to explore for new programs and exploit best practices
from other food banks is one of the major advantages of the network. In addition to learning
from the national network of affiliates, executive directors also talked about engaging with
affiliates who were geographically closer. This proximity makes it easier to travel between sites
to exchange ideas and cross-train employees. The second theme of managing knowledge relates
to interactions with these more proximate food banks.
Leveraging Local Relationships
Although the national meeting and other conferences are opportunities to identify
innovative new programs being tested across the network, another type of knowledge exchange
happens between proximal affiliates as programs are refined. The vice president of operations at
Central came from a for-profit company within the automotive industry and expressed his
surprise at how easy it was to communicate with other affiliates about ongoing process
refinements and benchmarking:
“There’s a lot more knowledge sharing in this group. I just don’t
remember calling up another plant manager at another automotive
company to say, ‘Hey, can I come over and look at your facility?’
The benchmarking wasn’t as easy in those industries.”
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In addition to visiting different sites to see how different affiliates conduct their
operations, the vice president of operations at Central also had standing meetings on the third
Wednesday of every month with six other food banking operations managers in order to compare
notes. At this same site, the executive director of Central said:
“I call all my coworkers, and my other directors and say ‘I am
going to have an issue with this and I am not really sure how I
should do it’ and ‘can I bounce this off of you and will you give
me some feedback’, or ‘I heard you are doing this could you send
me your job description on that? I would love that so I don’t have
to recreate the wheel.”
These collaborative relationships with other local executive directors and managers
within the network of affiliates helped to lower the risks associated with new programs and to
increase the efficiency of day-to-day operations because the managers were able to work from
pre-existing routines that other affiliates had already refined. In addition to communication
between the top managers, the executive director of Orange described the process for socializing
new hires into the food bank’s mission and procedures by sending staff to different affiliates.
“That’s the best thing about the network. When we get new
employees we send them to another [affiliate] just to see how they
do it.”
This system facilitates knowledge sharing and the informal contacts necessary for
effective exploratory behavior. The executive director at Wright also mentioned how an
59

innovative piece of machinery increased the food bank’s efficiency by reducing the rate of
discarded cans from 60% to 20%, but remarked: “We didn’t develop this. This is in another best
practice from another food bank.” By exchanging staff and ideas at the local level, the executive
directors are able to refine their ongoing operations. These two means of knowledge exchange,
national conferences and local interactions, both act as a source of new information for food
bank managers. As a method for managing ambidextrous operations, innovative new programs
are highlighted at the national conference, and existing programs are refined through contact
with other local or regional affiliates. Table 9 presents additional quotes related to managing
knowledge to facilitate exploratory and exploitive actions in the food banks. These two
complementary processes allow the food banks to promote their unique innovations on a national
scale while simultaneously learning from other local affiliates in order to minimize the time and
effort spent inventing new programs and reducing the likelihood of failure. In addition to
managing knowledge, a second process that emerged from the interviews was that of retaining
talent. Directors and other interviewees alluded to this concept in terms of two sub-processes:
hiring professional management and outsourcing non-core routines.
Retaining Talent
Exploitation leads to consistent returns from process refinements that result from the
reduced costs associated with repeated routines. Because CN considers management and
executive compensation as a negative factor when calculating ratings for efficiency, I asked
about maximizing the use of volunteers to minimize salary and overhead expenses. The vice
president at Wright responded, “There are some of our charities that we serve that operate like
that (i.e. all volunteer labor), but not for very long.” Although the executive directors expressed
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their gratitude to their dedicated volunteers, they all agreed that their organizations were too
large and complex to operate without specialized full-time management, which lead to the first
sub-process related to retaining talent: hiring professional management. The executive director of
Central described the changing face of food bank managers:
“When I started my career back in 60’s and 70’s, any kind of nonprofit or social work job was done by a woman because it didn’t
pay enough for a man to get involved in unless they got in at the
administrative level. So back then if you did a survey of who ran
nonprofits and how long they ran them, they were all women and
they were all social workers … If I was graduating from college
today, I wouldn’t get a degree in social work. I would get a degree
in business or marketing. Then I would probably get an MBA of
some sort, maybe a law degree.”
This sentiment is reflected by the other managers who have seen the industry change
dramatically from its grass-roots beginnings. The vice president of operations at Central
remarked:
“This organization is starting to get so big that it’s you know, it
needs to run more like a corporation. It needs to have more of a
mindset of, ‘We need to look at everything that we invest our
money in and our time in to make sure that we’re going to be good
stewards of our resources and our donors’ money and our donors’
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food and we’re doing the right thing with it.’ So it’s not as
grassroots as it was.”
The changing dynamics of the food banking industry have influenced the types of
managers best suited to operate in this environment. Rather than the social workers described by
the executive director of Central, the focus on efficiency, accountability, and reporting
necessitates managers whose skills have been honed in formal bureaucracies can be transferred
to a NFP context.
Hiring Professional Management
This description of the type of managers who would typically be found in a food bank
twenty or thirty years ago stands in sharp contrast to the professional managers found in today’s
food banks. Food banks have become so much larger in terms of their complexity, staffing, and
number of programs, that they now draw from backgrounds in the management of for-profit
businesses, the military, and academia. The executive director of Central described the benefits
of managers with these types of skill sets:
“I’ll never forget when a gentleman went to work as the CEO of
the food bank in Chicago and he was a one-star General that came
out of the Marine Corps. I wondered what does a one-star General
know about food banking? Well, you know what? You have to
know how to work with people and you got to know how to assess
and how to measure outcomes and all those things.”
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The vice president of operations at Central explained how the introduction of
engineering, military, and professional managers played a role in influencing the growing culture
of efficiency at Central and a reduction in non-routinized practices:
“You got some push back for awhile and you had some turnover
and had some few folks that didn’t really like the way that uh that I
managed and you know, because it was. It was really very ‘fly by
the seat of our pants’ out here. You know, running around with
hair on fire every day. I don’t like doing that. I keep going back to,
“You know what? It’s not our money.” We are helping people and
if we can do it safer and we’re protecting with our quality of food
and we’re doing it, we’re protecting our donors’ money and our
donors’ resources by doing it more efficiently, then that is helping
people which is our mission.”
Incorporating managers from the for-profit world allowed food banks to begin to tap into
new skill sets that improved both exploration and exploitation. Former marketers and salespeople
became externally-focused vice presidents for community relations, and managers with logistics,
engineering, or operations experience became internally-focused vice presidents of operations,
overseeing the efficient storage and distribution of food within a large, fast-moving warehouse
environment. The purposeful inclusion of these professionals allows each executive director to
take advantage of new ideas and refinements. The vice president of operations at Central
described the impact that his presence has had on the day-to-day warehouse operations:
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“The big dips and the peaks and valleys are leveled out a little bit
more. So that was a big kind of a paradigm shift here. It was just
like, “Look there’s a lot of things that we think we can’t control
here that we actually can if we just put some process and procedure
in place.” And we’ve been working really hard at that for the last
six to eight months, really trying to implement a lot of those
processes and procedures and standardize things as much as we
can.
In addition to improving exploitive processes in the warehouse through ongoing
refinement, the addition of an on-staff professional chef at Central allowed the food bank to build
a demonstration kitchen to engage in a variety of exploratory strategies for community
awareness. Central is located in a large corporate park with few alternates for meals during the
day, so they open to the public for lunch two days per week. They also host a cooking camp for
teens in the summer, and provide space for other organizations to hold meetings and events. This
exploratory approach to community outreach developed as a direct result of the executive chef
and the executive director.
Another result of this influx of skill sets and expertise is an environment that became
progressively more professionalized, with each group of managers focusing on either exploration
or exploitation strategies. This account from the vice president of community relations at Wright
describes the need for a more standardized approach to grants:
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“I remember one turning point was a grant that I helped work on
for Kraft. When Kraft Foods got really involved with food
banking, I still remember seeing their grant. They wanted a
business plan more or less. You know, they really wanted us to lay
out well, ‘Who are you going to get the food from? How much is it
going to cost you to transport it?’ You know, at that point we had
been factoring in those kinds of things with programs, but they
really took it to the next level as far as being very exact on what
we were going to do with the money and you know, and how um
our plan.”
By bringing in more professional talent to explore for new programs as well improve
efficiencies in existing programs, food banks were able to attract more grants from large, forprofit companies such as Kraft that wanted to see a professionally-managed food bank receiving
their donated money and products. The only way to present this level of professionalism to large
corporate donors was through the use of skilled managers, and hiring and retaining skilled
managers required offering market-level compensation in order to stay with the food banks. The
executive director of Riverside described having to pay market wages to attract and retain
talented people.
“You can’t operate with all volunteers. Nothing like this. You have
to have the best that you can afford and that’s always been rough
on us. You get the best, you pay as much as you can, and you get
the best that you can get for that. And if you are competitive it
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comes back to good staff and people. You don’t want to train
people and have them jumping ship to go someplace where they
can make a lot more money. So you either provide benefits, make
the pay equitable, or other intrinsic things that people appreciate.
We can’t have people working here who are below the poverty
level themselves. That’s a goal that we need to adhere to.”
This concept of minimizing turnover came through in interviews as a much stronger
desire than minimizing labor costs. Directors and executive directors were committed to keeping
these managers employed with the food bank so that they could develop the experience and
connections needed to help the food bank succeed. The executive director of Orange explained
that their food bank had not previously paid a competitive salary and kept losing talented people
until she went to the board to ask for more money for staff salaries:
“So my first five to seven years of not doing a very good job of
managing was getting the right people on the bus. You couldn’t
pay the people to do the job you needed them to do so of course,
they’d leave the minute they got a better job. So after about five
years of watching that occur, I said [to the board] ‘Okay, if you
guys let me pay this person this much per year, if we’re not going
forward after a year, we’ll go right back to where you wanted them
paid.’”
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This process of hiring people, only to quickly lose them to higher-paying jobs elsewhere,
worked counter to the food bank’s goals, but actually yielded favorable ratings from CN for a
high rate of efficiency in terms of administrative expenses. Although the food bank managers
said that business-savvy donors understand the concept of paying for talent, “Kraft and some of
these bigger companies realize that we can’t feed 38,000 people a month without the staff
support” (vice president, Wright), some of the smaller donors did not see this as a worthwhile
expenditure of organizational funds. The executive director at Central remarked,
“I don’t think it’s a hard sell to [business leaders], but it is a hard
sell to the person that gives me five dollars a year and says, ‘I can’t
believe they are paying you that much money. I can’t believe that
you have this many staff.’”
Likewise, the executive director of Orange said,
“When some people think you’re working for a non-profit, you
should be making thirty grand a year and love every minute of it
because you’re helping the needy. If I don’t pay my quality people
what they would make on the market, they’re not going to stay
here. I mean, everybody wants to help a hungry person, but they
also want to feed their children too.”
Despite this trend towards more professional managers, some functions remain outside
the scope of what the food bank can most efficiently execute with their current staff, leading to
the second sub-process related to retaining talent: outsourcing non-core activities.
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Outsourcing Non-Core Activities
Executive directors were also outsourcing non-core activities to other organizations in
order to free up in-house employees for other tasks and to raise funds more efficiently with
professional fundraising organizations. In each interview, the top managers mentioned that fundraising specialists were able to generate donations more efficiently than the food banks
themselves were. Consequently, all four food banks had turned to professional fundraisers to
bring in revenue, as described by the executive director of Riverside:
“We use outside fundraisers for direct mail, which has been very
beneficial. If we didn’t do that we would not be able to keep the
doors open. It was a hard sell when we first started it because the
cost is considerable. It is about twenty-five percent of what you
bring in and a lot of it’s up front so that was a hard thing to sell to
the board, but we have been doing it for five years now and it’s
proven to be a success.”
The executive director at Orange also described transitioning from
fundraising in-house to using an outside organization to handle direct mail:
“We now hire a direct mail company in Boston that does our direct
mail. Back when I started, we were writing our own letters and this
is the whole food bank world. We all started with maybe four
people and $300,000 budgets and handwriting letters to people. It
costs us a ton. It’s totally efficient and they’re very astute in how
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they write it. They know how to get that dollar. So it’s a nobrainer.”
Beyond direct mail for marketing and fundraising, the executive director of Central also
described using an outside firm for personnel until the need became great enough to hire a fulltime employee:
“We have used outside consultants in personnel until we grew to
be larger and now we have hired that person who was on contract
and they are now full-time staff. So I think that if you just look and
see what’s new and who can do it better and maybe at a much
more reasonable cost. I don’t think that we always have to have
everything in-house.”
This newfound level of professionalism made food bank managers more willing to look
beyond the boundaries of the organization for both exploratory needs (personnel consulting) or
exploitative needs (efficient fundraising). This minimization of non-core processes increases
efficiencies by relying on the unique expertise that professional fundraisers have and allows the
full-time staff to focus on exploring for new programs and services. Table 10 presents additional
quotes related to the ways that retaining talent facilitated exploratory and exploitive actions in
the food banks. By identifying the non-core processes that could be offloaded to another
organization, the food banks keep their professional, mission-focused staff engaged in the dayto-day work of food banking, rather than shifting them to monotonous tasks such as addressing
envelopes for fundraising.
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Enabling Leadership
The third major process described in the interviews dealt with the concept of leadership,
specifically a hands-off approach to encouraging experimentation within the organization. The
interviewees described this leadership style as a function of both the top managers internal to the
food bank as well as the leadership from the national Feeding America headquarters. The first
leadership sub-process, headquarters coordination, facilitated ambidextrous operations by
exposing distant food banks to innovative new ideas as well as efficient best practices that had
already been refined.
Facilitating Connections Nationally
From their early days as food pantries serving a small radius of local communities, food
banking operations have become increasingly more structured as a function of the national
Feeding America network that was originally created to improve efficiencies. Since then,
Feeding America has taken on other roles as well, as described by one of the vice presidents at
Central:
“Food banks have been around since the late 70s into the 80s and
then Feeding America started in the 90s. They do a lot of our
national marketing. So they have really pulled our resources
together which has been very good.”
Although Feeding America operates as a national network with one headquarters in
Chicago, the executive director of Central explains that there are differences between their
network and other large NFPs:
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“Our food bank network was or is different than, say the Red Cross
or the Girl Scouts or Boy Scouts, which based it on a national level
and then came down. It’s a much different format and structure.
We started at a grass-roots level and came up. After we all started
to rise across the country, we realized that we needed a national
platform in which to carry our message, or advocacy for food
donations or fund raising or marketing. So that’s really helped.”
From this grass-roots start in the 1970s, food banks have become a large, cooperative
network of affiliates, first under the Second Harvest brand, and more recently under the Feeding
America brand. The executive director at Wright describes how Feeding America has facilitated
the growth of affiliated food banks.
“We are very blessed to have a national organization that gives us
best practices that really guides us in the strategic planning
process, that you know, we have a contract with them so we have
some guidance and some road map to stay, you know, to not stay
where we are but to go to the next level from where we were in
1986 to maybe 1992, we were in that grass-roots organization
stage and then get to a larger organization.”
Beyond providing a “road map” for growth, the national headquarters also facilitates
donations of food and funding from large donors who may be otherwise hesitant to donate food
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to a local food bank that lacks the backing of a national organization. According to the executive
director of Central,
“On a national level, what they do is they solicit all the large food
companies and get mega truck loads of products that we could
never access and get. In addition to that, they advocate on a
national level in Washington, D.C. at all for federal nutrition
programs … to ensure that we are going to have access to those
kinds of items. We can’t do that at a local level. It would take too
much energy and too much money to do that.”
This network provides a variety of opportunities and connections for the affiliated food
banks but does not directly intervene in day-to-day food bank operations. Each affiliate is given a
set service area consisting of a number of counties and one of the conditions of membership in
the network is that affiliates are not allowed to solicit donations of money or food outside their
service area. Although Feeding America sets some standards and channels resources to the
affiliates, all of the executive directors commented that Feeding America provides the affiliates
with a great deal of freedom to operate their programs as they see fit. The executive director of
Riverside explained the relationship between the food banks and the headquarters in the
following terms:
“They don’t tell us what to do and how to do it, but they monitor
our storage practices. We have a contract. And as long as we are
within that contract, you know, we are good. They will come every
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other year and visit us and see how we keep our warehouse and all
our inventories. They raise funds on a national level. They will
allocate those around the network. They raise food on a national
level with a lot of national donors and they will allocate that
around.”
The legitimacy of working with a Chicago-based national organization facilitated
partnerships between local affiliates and branches of other national organizations in their
immediate area. The executive director of Orange explained how having a national organization
with its own board of directors benefitted the local affiliates by providing a venue for major forprofit partners to contribute to ending hunger. She also explained how the headquarters was able
to increase the visibility and legitimacy of ending hunger in America by involving executives
from major for-profit businesses as Directors.
“They’ve got Kraft’s president on their board and ConAgra’s
president on their board. American Airlines’ president is on their
board. They’re in Chicago and it’s a national organization and they
feed people, so a lot of people want to be affiliated with that. And
so we gain from that in a major way.”
In addition to the connections brokered at the national level to improve exploration and
exploitation, the local leadership also approached their role with an eye towards encouraging
innovation from their managers. Encouraging experimentation at the local level provided a
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steady stream of innovative ideas and efficient refinements for the food bank as well as the other
affiliates in the network.
Encouraging Experimentation Locally
Although the Feeding America headquarters plays two roles by facilitating the spread of
new ideas and the spread of best practices between affiliates, the local executive directors also
fostered a culture of experimentation, as this quote from the Executive Chef at Central describes:
“[The executive director] is probably one of the greatest
visionaries. She surrounds herself with creative and innovative
people and then lets them do their thing. But there [are] always
parameters and as long you operate within the parameters, she
allows you to make mistakes.”
This type of enabling leadership style may be a result of the hands-off management from
the Feeding America headquarters, but the interviewees described a culture of experimentation
where new ideas for continuous improvement were championed by the executive director. The
Vice President of Operations at Central described the process by saying,
“We capitalized on getting smart people that were in for-profit
worlds and bringing them over to non-profit and just setting them
loose and saying, ‘If you’ve got an idea and it is going to be able to
bring revenue into the food bank and help us feed more people
inside our service area, then let’s do it. Let’s try it.’”
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This desire to create innovative ideas resulted in a number of idiosyncratic programs that
were started at one food bank and subsequently copied by others. Programs were developed
based on specific local needs, unique opportunities, or even particular geographic endowments,
such as the natural environment that permitted a community garden at Riverside. From its
inception as an urban food bank, Riverside had a community garden staffed by area senior
citizens. When the food bank outgrew its original site and moved to a more suburban location,
they kept the concept of the community garden and placed a small agricultural area in their back
yard, complete with potting sheds, greenhouses, a water cistern, and raised vegetable beds. The
executive director at Riverside explained:
“There are seven programs. The garden is one that we started. We
teach a lot of classes on gardening and farming and rain barrels and
maintenance and all sorts of environmental things. When we built
this building, we had some land available, and we knew we wanted
to put up a garden here. This is a teaching garden as well as a
growing garden. The teaching part of it was just a way to sustain it
and you know we charge for the classes and it brings money into
the program and covers supplies and plants.”
Master gardeners volunteer to staff this program and the garden provides fresh vegetables
for the food bank, making the community garden a more efficient source of nutritious food than
waiting to receive donations of expired perishable goods of questionable quality from nearby
grocery stores. Because of the linkages between the other affiliates, as well as the relationship
with the national headquarters, programs such as this one, which are developed at a single food
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bank, can be recognized by the headquarters for its innovative method of efficiently producing
fresh food without reliance on donors. Once this program has been sufficiently refined, it can be
replicated at other food banks across the country through the knowledge sharing networks. Table
11 presents additional quotes related to the enabling leadership style that facilitated exploratory
and exploitive actions in the food banks.
These two sub-processes, facilitating connections and encouraging experimentation, are
both ways that the food banks were able to explore for new opportunities and then successfully
exploit their own knowledge. The connections forged at the national level brought in new
resources for the food banks in the form of monetary donations, food, new trucks, and lasting
partnerships with other national food producers and retailers. The national headquarters also
maintained standards for storage practices to make sure that food banks were operating in a safe,
efficient manner. At the local level, a culture of encouraging experimentation allowed the
professional managers the latitude to experiment and implement new ideas. The top managers
and boards of directors were, on the whole, receptive to new ideas and allowed other employees
to contribute their innovative ideas for exploration and exploitation.
Combining these three processes—managing knowledge, retaining talent, and enabling
leadership—presents a narrative of an industry undergoing major transformation as sources of
donated food dwindle and government funding shrinks at the same time that needs for services
grow. In response to these changes, the food banks have developed an efficient system of
knowledge management by using the national meetings to explore for new ideas and leveraging
local network connections to refine ideas for greater efficiencies. These food banks look beyond
the traditional social work background to bring in leaders with military, operations, or for-profit
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business experience and then socialize these new entrants into the industry through repeated
interactions with other affiliates. From their prior experience, managers with functional
backgrounds in marketing and sales may develop innovative new programs to meet growing
needs while managers with experience in operations or logistics may turn their expertise to
improving the efficiency of operations so that productivity gains can be reinvested into the
mission’s programs. The enabling leadership style from the national headquarters presents
opportunities for best practices and connections to new sources of revenue, while a culture of
experimentation at the local level provides a source for new ideas to spread throughout the
network. As the executive directors have a better understanding of the unique skills and abilities
that their staff bring to the food bank, they also understand that the best way to maximize these
talents is by giving staff enough leeway to operate. Whether an individual’s skills lie on the
exploration side (e.g., marketing, sales, community outreach) or the exploitation side (e.g.,
operations, warehousing, logistics), these executive directors have found that the best results
occur from managerial autonomy rather than bureaucratic, top-down direction.
The output of this model is the creation and recombination of ideas to develop and refine
new programs: Idiosyncratic programs develop based on the specialized local knowledge at each
affiliate. These novel programs range from the culinary arts center at Central, the award-winning
backpack program for children’s nutrition at Orange, or the year-round community garden for
teaching and supplying fresh vegetables to the food bank at Riverside. Any of these local
innovations are ripe for transplantation to other sites within the network and Feeding America
facilitates the cross-pollination of ideas by organizing the national conference. This cycle of
exploration at the local level, followed by dissemination at the national level, and then
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subsequent exploitation and refinement at the local level again, results in an ongoing process of
ambidextrous operations. The main contribution of the network of affiliates is the feedback loop
that emerges as top managers and other staff members communicate with each other to discover
new programs and ways to operate existing programs more efficiently. Through these learning
loops, individual food banks harness the collective power of the network to take on new ideas for
efficient growth and to contribute their own ideas into the network for replication and
amplification (Plowman et al., 2007). Individually, each of these concepts—professionalization,
knowledge exchange, and leadership—all influence the food bank’s ability to operate
ambidextrously. Together, they create a coherent narrative of different ways that local food
banks are importing new knowledge and skills into their network from other industries and then
using the power of the Feeding America to influence exploration and exploitation.
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Chapter 5 – Discussion
Discussion of Quantitative Results
As previously mentioned in the results chapter, there are a number of caveats associated
with interpreting the quantitative findings of this stud; however, despite these challenges, the
quantitative portion of this study makes three main contributions. First, it extends the research
begun by Szper and Prakash, (2011) and Seo and colleagues (2009) by analyzing the entire CN
dataset. Previous studies that have looked only at single industries or state-wide service areas are
inherently limited in their generalizability to other contexts. Because the entire CN dataset is not
easy to download in its entirety, undertaking multi-industry studies such as this one become
more complicated. This study shows the utility of novel data collection tools such as Visual Web
Ripper to organizational research. Without the ability to download a single dataset that had been
pre-packaged for analysis, manually gathering the 5,450 CN records into a spreadsheet for
analysis would have taken a considerable amount of time and would likely contain more errors
than the automated retrieval from Visual Web Ripper. Removing the hurdle of needing preexisting datasets in order to conduct large-scale research of secondary data means that
researchers may find themselves asking new questions that previously would have been
considered unanswerable without an existing data source. This type of data collection tool has
utility beyond this project and can be leveraged in a variety of different data collection projects
to gather data that may not otherwise exist in a pre-existing spreadsheet format.
Second, this study highlights a number of questions about the nature of specific industry
effects related to OA. The fact that so many of the industries from the CN dataset did not yield
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significant results for either exploration or exploitation on fiscal performance suggests that
different industry structures may contain more subtle differences than initially thought. Many of
the industries from Table 1 are in creative or high-tech industries such as robotics (Katila &
Ahuja, 2002), biotechnology (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004), electronics (Atuahene-Gima, 2005)
and product design (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009). Finding organizations that are actively
exploring for new products and markets and also refining existing competencies may be easier to
do in industries like these than in NFPs, which may be more conservative in terms of growth
goals. Across the 33 industries of the CN dataset, this study was unable to replicate the
overwhelmingly positive impact of ambidexterity on organizational performance reported in
Table 1. Possible reasons for this outcome are discussed in greater detail in the limitations
section of this study.
Third, this study offers three possible explanations for why NFPs may differ from their
for-profit counterparts in terms of their ability to pursue ambidexterity across a variety of
industries. The first possibility is that NFPs are qualitatively different from their for-profit
counterparts. Despite the fact that they face similar constraints to for-profit firms, it is possible
that the theoretical underpinnings of OA are too deeply grounded in the for-profit sector and do
not translate to an NFP context that focuses on high levels of efficiency and a narrow mission. A
second possible reason for this finding could come from the proxies used to measure exploration
and exploitation. Although they claim to measure organizational growth and efficiency, if the
CN ratings are actually poor measures for assessing exploration and exploitation in
organizational research, they are likely to report skewed results. Finally, the multi-industry
nature of this study may highlight a file-drawer problem present in much of organizational
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research (Rosenthal, 1979). The preponderance of studies in Table 1 reporting positive impacts
of ambidextrous operations on organizational outcomes may simply be a selection bias in the
publishing process, such that studies with negative or non-significant findings are less likely to
be published.
Despite these contributions, the use of the datasets such as CN is ill-equipped to answer
this study’s second research question: specifically, how NFPs are engaging in ambidextrous
behavior and the underlying processes. The following section describes and discusses the
findings from the qualitative portion of this study.
Discussion of Qualitative Results
The qualitative portion of this study illuminates processes undertaken by a sample of
food banks as they pursue the efficient delivery of the services their mission demands while
simultaneously seeking new growth initiatives for diverse projects such as equipment purchases,
the development of new programs to reach more clients, and capital campaigns to fund new
building projects. The processes of managing knowledge, retaining talent, and enabling
leadership allow the food banks to operate ambidextrously and the findings from this study have
the potential to speak to other organizational theories that may explain some of the motivations
for these processes.
Managing Knowledge: Headquarters and Subsidiary Relationships
The concept of strategic stickiness (Austin, Stevenson, & Wei-Skillern, 2006) assumes
that NFPs are constrained in their ability to explore new options by their founding missions that
dictate the type of strategic options that NFPs may pursue. In addition to the inability to deviate
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substantially from their mission, the food banks in this study are also geographically constrained
by nature of their service area. Each food bank has a particular territory of counties to serve and
is unable to solicit donors outside this service area. Despite these constraints of geography and
mission scope, the food banks found many ways to develop new programs that meet their stated
mission and to share these new initiatives with other affiliates.
The top managers of each food bank leverage their connections with other network
affiliates to maximize opportunities for exploration and exploitation. Exploration derives from
large meetings such as the national conference where executive directors and other managers get
exposure to best-in-class innovations and improvements made by food banks all over the
country. As a result, affiliates are able to tap the best practices of other partners within the
network to identify possible opportunities for new programs. In this regard, network affiliates are
acting in the capacity of subsidiaries of the headquarters in Chicago, and like their for-profit
counterparts, the creation of new knowledge, innovation, and competitive advantage has become
a collective effort across the entire network (Birkinshaw, Hood, & Jonsson, 1998).
Although the headquarters is assumed to control most of the firm-specific knowledge and
advantages (Rugman & Verbeke, 1992), subsidiaries can contribute local innovations to the rest
of the organization (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1986). When subsidiaries develop their own initiatives,
it is a result of identifying opportunities and committing resources to that opportunity
(Birkinshaw, 1997). The development of the first mobile food pantry perfectly illustrates this
concept. In this example, the Grand Rapids food bank committed excess equipment (i.e., an
unused truck) to an unmet opportunity that they saw in needing to distribute food quickly before
it would be discarded. Following the development of this initiative, other affiliates were able to
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exploit their membership in the Feeding America network to attend the national meeting and
learn more about the mobile pantry initiative in Grand Rapids.
With exposure to new ideas, other managers can begin to adapt these initiatives for their
local service areas. In addition to meetings, local affiliates also exploit the research and
connections that the headquarters develops at the national level. The food banks are unable to
serve populations or solicit donations from beyond their service area; ideas must be adopted by
other food banks in order to take root in other locations. Managers are also unable to execute
their own strategy in other territories; rather, they must demonstrate its utility in their own
territory in order for it to spread to other territories. The national conference is one way to gain
large-scale exposure to ideas that begin in distant territories.
A second way that knowledge moves through the food bank network is between other
network affiliates without coordination from the national headquarters. Executive directors and
other senior leaders of different affiliates suggested a number of reasons for this system
including the hands-off approach to strategic direction from the headquarters in Chicago.
Because the creation of the national headquarters was a comparatively recent event in the history
of the food banking network, the food banks retained a great deal of autonomy at the local level,
including which services they would or would not provide. This dynamic of informal
communication between different executive directors reflects their level of connectedness
(Jansen et al., 2006) and influences the refinement of ideas currently in use at local affiliates. In
addition to communication between executive directors, affiliates also expose their employees to
different sites within the network to facilitate the flow of program refinements between affiliates.
By physically going to different affiliates, employees have an opportunity to see different
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operational systems and structures, apply their own specialized knowledge at remote sites, and
bring refinements back to their home affiliate.
These two dynamics—formalized meetings from the headquarters and informal
knowledge-sharing routines between the affiliates—suggest that the literature on subsidiaries and
multi-national organizations may benefit from a better understanding of how ideas develop
locally, are channeled upwards by the headquarters, expand and adapt through the network, and
are refined through the informal connections inherent in the subsidiaries. In addition to identity
and knowledge sharing, the final major theme to emerge from interviewing the executive
directors and managers was that of leadership, both from the executive directors themselves and
from the board of directors.
Retaining Talent: Organizational Identity and Image
As previously discussed, the changing external context has required a major shift in how
food banks operate. These changes required the food banks to shift from their-grass root
beginnings as organizations run by volunteers and social workers to efficient, accountable
businesses. To meet the organization’s needs and to fulfill their mission, food banks became
increasingly professionalized in order to enhance their legitimacy with larger donors and
improve their organizational reputation (Brown, Dacin, Pratt, & Whetten, 2006) as efficient and
business-savvy. The food banks studied here have all embraced the concept of
professionalization as a way to continue to meet their mission. By creating their own national
organization based out of a major United States metropolis to negotiate with other national
organizations on their behalf, they have enhanced the legitimacy of all of the food banks in the
network. Directors have also embraced the concept that previous models (e.g., donated food,
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extensive volunteer labor) no longer work effectively to meet the mission and have adapted their
strategies to stay ahead of these changes.
The executive directors believe in the value of hiring experienced people from industries
other than social work and paying them a competitive wage. Despite the departure from their
grass-roots founding, the fact that the mission has not substantially changed makes it easier to
justify strategic shifts such as these in order to meet their organizational mission. Further, the
food banks’ organizational identity (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991) is malleable enough to not be
threatened by professionalization; thus, hiring professional managers from the for-profit sector is
actually seen as consistent with their need to make existing routines more efficient to attract new
corporate donors while also exploring for innovative new programs to meet a growing demand
from their base of recipients. Executive directors say that business leaders understand this shift
towards professionalization because of the same dynamics that they cope with in the for-profit
sector. Because the executive directors and managers see this trend toward professionalization as
congruent with their changing identity (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991), initiatives for more paid staff,
routinization of work, and outsourcing relationships with other vendors do not damage their
organizational identity and they understand that these changes are both necessary and consistent
with their mission.
The opposite side of identity is image (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991), which represents the
perceptions of external stakeholders. Although the executive directors see this shift towards
professionalization as consistent with their identity to provide food to hungry individuals, not all
of the stakeholders believe that these changes tarnish the food banks’ image. The incongruity
between the food bank’s intended image (i.e., what the organization wants others to think about
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it) and the food bank’s reputation (what stakeholders actually think about the organization) may
lead to conflicts (Brown, Dacin, Pratt, & Whetten, 2006). This sector presents a unique challenge
for organizations that engage in ambidexterity because stakeholder expectations constrain them
in two ways. First, the focus on a strong mission reduces the apparent need for exploratory
activities. Because the goal is feeding hungry people, deviating too far from this mission may
result in pushback and concern that a particular program is too unrelated to the food bank’s
goals; thus, focusing on existing programs that are already feeding people is the easiest course of
action to follow. Second, the nature of charitable work means that external stakeholders assume
that money spent on non-programmatic expenses is wasteful or inefficient. Directors noted that
smaller donors and other community members do not understand that the need for wellcompensated leadership or new facilities and underscored the importance of educating external
stakeholders on the ongoing needs at the food bank.
Watchdog organizations such as CN report expenditures such as fundraising costs, staff
salaries, and utilities as overhead expenses that count against efficiency ratios. What these ratios
fail to account for are the intangible benefits of long-tenured professional staff such as
management experience, social networks, and other aspects of human capital. Directors must
counter these claims with donors who also believe that paying staff is inefficient. In response to
these attitudes from external stakeholders, executive directors could respond by lowering salaries
or cutting staff in order to reinvest wages into mission-based programs, but this strategy is
unlikely to lead to long-term success given the turnover reported by the executive directors.
In addition to challenges surrounding rising salaries, directors must also convince outside
stakeholders that the growth initiatives they are pursuing are in the best interest of the
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organization. The managers understand that the changing operational context requires exploring
for new investments in space, refrigerated storage, and trucks to continue to meet their mission
and feed a growing number of hungry people. Communicating this need for growth and
exploration requires a certain level of issue selling (Dutton, Ashford, O’Neill, & Lawrence,
2001) to convince external stakeholders that these changes are necessary and that money spent
on things other than direct program costs still contributes to the food bank’s mission.
Consequently, expenditures for salaries, buildings, and new equipment present a challenge that
NFP managers must sell to donors and other external stakeholders who may not understand the
whole picture.
As the field has become more professional and more efficient in its operations, these
expectations of market-level salaries for talented employees and modern warehouses have
collided with stakeholder expectations of how their money is being spent on food bank
programs. Part of this misalignment may stem from a lack of education between the food banks
and their donors and other external stakeholders. The executive director of Central related a story
about a donor who said “Oh I thought that you go out in one little truck and go around.” To
which she replied, “What? I cover 22,000 square miles with 22 trucks.” The overall dependence
on external stakeholders for sources of funding and food donations means that managers are
particularly sensitive to claims of malfeasance. They understand, however, that the competency
trap (Levitt & March, 1988) may result in decreased performance because of attempting to
operate at the peak of efficiency. Without growing into larger spaces, the smaller spaces become
progressively less efficient over time as the mission remains unchanged and the need for
supplying food continues to grow. Despite the threats that professionalization brought to the
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image of the food banks, the overall impression is that these steps are necessary to continue
meeting their stated mission by facilitating exploratory new approaches to ending hunger and the
ongoing refinements that come from the efforts of professional managers.
Enabling Leadership: A Complexity Perspective
Traditional models of organizations assume that the world is knowable and that effective
leaders can rely on planning and control to direct organizational actions (Plowman & Duchon,
2008). Complexity leadership describes modern organizations in terms of adaptation and
emergence, rather than mechanistic descriptions of bureaucratic organizations (Uhl-Bien &
Marion, 2009), suggests that leadership emerges as the outcome of interactions among agents,
and focuses on the ways in which leaders facilitate interactions between organizational members
(Lichtenstein et al., 2006). Although none of the interviewees expressly referred to it as such,
this attitude towards leadership is seen at many levels throughout the food banking industry,
including between the top managers and the staff, the board of directors and the executive
directors, and even between the Feeding America headquarters and the local affiliates. The
overarching leadership style seen in the food bank network is to create basic structures such as
the affiliate network, hire professionals, and then, in the words of the vice president of operations
at Central, “setting them loose.” This style of leadership allows the professional managers to
develop creative solutions to novel challenges and to use their ideas and experience to bring in
more revenue to the food bank or to minimize costs, each of which influences a particular side of
OA.
At the local level, managerial autonomy generated unique programs within the scope of
the organization’s mission. Although the managers were free to explore for new program
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options, the interdependent nature of their work necessitates coordination with the other
organizational members.
At the national level, Feeding America gave the food banks autonomy to develop and
implement the programs that would best serve their local communities. In a way, the enabling
leadership style that developed across the food bank network was driven more by what Feeding
America did not do, rather than what it did do for the affiliates. Local-level autonomy was
permitted in many ways, including not mandating that food banks change their name after the
national network was created, not requiring standardized programs across the network, and not
directing how donated money would be spent. By playing the role of facilitator (Uhl-Bien,
Marion, & McKelvey, 2007), Feeding America was able to spread ideas between food banks,
organize partnerships with food manufacturers and retailers at the national level to influence
local donations, and channel resources from national fundraising events to local affiliates. After
making these connections, the local food bank leadership was responsible for implementing and
adapting the strategies. In this way, the enabling leadership style of the Feeding America
headquarters allowed affiliated food banks to exploit their network membership to receive
information, funding, and food donations. This leadership style also allowed affiliated food
banks to explore for new programs and refinements and new strategies for meeting the need in
their local community.
These three main factors—a robust organizational identity that can withstand
professionalization, strong relationships and different functions for subsidiaries and the Feeding
America headquarters, and a complexity leadership focus for handling emergent challenges as
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they arose—all appear to contribute to the food banks’ ability to successfully pursue exploration
and exploitation.
Finally, one of the key contributions of this study to the ambidexterity literature is to
suggest that within the typology of different types of OA (Simsek et al, 2009), these
organizations are leveraging their new professional identity, their knowledge-sharing routines,
and their complexity leadership style to engage simultaneously in multiple forms of
ambidexterity: harmonic, cyclical, partitional, and reciprocal (Simsek et al., 2009). Structure and
time, two components suggested by Simsek and colleagues (2009), appear to play a key role in
affiliates’ abilities to explore and exploit. In contrast to some of the received viewpoints in the
ambidexterity literature, executive directors and senior managers of food banks neither consider
exploration and exploitation as dichotomous outcomes (March, 1991) nor do they engage only
one type of ambidexterity or another (Simsek et al., 2009). In contrast, food banks engage in
multiple types of OA simultaneously. At any particular moment, an affiliate may be engaging in
cyclical ambidexterity through a capital campaign to raise funds for a new building, while also
engaging in partitional ambidexterity by outsourcing fundraising to another entity. Refining the
concept of OA into sub-categorizations is helpful as future research on ambidexterity can begin
to tease out different processes in play. Qualitative studies such as this one extend our
understanding of how organizations manage multiple types of ambidextrous operations both
simultaneously and sequentially. From these findings, the following section describes managerial
implications for practice in organizations.
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Managerial Implications
Understanding both the what and the how of OA present opportunities for managers to
employ some of the findings from this study in their own practice. The results from the
quantitative portion of this dissertation suggest that particular industry effects may moderate the
impact of high levels of efficiency; thus, what works well in one industry may not translate to
another. Benchmarking against close industry competitors (or in the case of NFPs, affiliates)
when possible, will likely provide a more accurate picture of the relationship between
exploratory actions, exploitive actions, and financial performance. The qualitative results suggest
a number of processes associated with ambidextrous operations in the food banking industry that
may benefit other organizations as well.
First, this sample of food banks illustrates the importance of managing knowledge at two
levels. Although the Chicago headquarters acts in a coordinating role, the best ideas may not
necessarily come from this office. The truly innovative programs may come from subsidiaries
that need the centralized resources of a headquarters to both refine the program and disseminate
it across the network. By facilitating connections between the different affiliates and arranging
an annual conference, the headquarters occupied a central role in the network’s structure, but did
not use this role to impose their strategic goals on the local affiliates. The local directors also
understood the value of sending their employees to different locations to see how similar tasks
were performed differently. Managers may want to consider the role that standard operating
procedures play in their daily operations, how these standards came to be, and how exposure to
possible alternates may yield process improvements.
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Second, each of the managers described the importance of human resources to their
ability to remain both efficient and innovative. Comments such as, “We capitalized on getting
smart people that were in for-profit worlds and bringing them over to non-profit and just setting
them loose,” from the vice president of operations at Central echo Pfeffer’s (2005, 2010)
sentiments that humans are the final frontier for competitive advantage. Retaining talent became
a key theme throughout the interviews as the directors described how the food banking industry
had shifted from one dominated by volunteers and social workers to a fine-tuned business model
with connections across multiple industries. Although many of the executive directors could
point to innovative programs or idiosyncratic initiatives that were only in operation at their site,
none of them believed that the programs themselves were the value in the organization. All of
the executive directors commented on their staff members’ dedication and creativity in
developing and implementing ideas to meet the food bank’s ongoing mission. A key take-away
for managers is that the ongoing training and motivation of employees is just as important in a
non-competitive setting like NFPs as it is in for-profit organizations.
Third, an enabling leadership style was seen across the different levels of the
organization. At the local level, enabling leaders manage the organization’s internal conditions in
a way that is consistent with the overarching mission (Uhl-Bien, Marion, & McKelvey, 2007).
From the food banking context, the directors were receptive to new ideas that enabled the
organization to more effectively meet its stated mission. Leaders with an enabling style can also
help shepherd projects from idea to implementation (Howell & Boies, 2004) by championing
new initiatives to other stakeholders such as boards of directors. At the national level, the
Feeding America headquarters demonstrated an enabling leadership style through the degree of
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autonomy given to the local affiliates. Kauffman (1995) has suggested that leaders need to
forego searching for perfect solutions and instead focus on achieving a series of “workable”
solutions that will advance the organization’s mission. Managers interested in maximizing the
value of the professional talent within their organization may want to consider a new style of
leadership that focuses less on predicting a knowable future and more on enabling others to
leverage their creativity and skills for the organization’s benefit.
Study Limitations and Future Research Directions
Despite the theoretical and managerial contributions from this study, there are a number
of limitations inherent within the study design that may be overcome by future studies. Despite
the myriad advantages of large datasets for theory testing, there remain a number of
disadvantages that must be noted.
Limitations of Charity Navigator
First, by limiting the analysis to data collected from IRS-reported financial statements,
assessing the degree of theoretical correspondence between the extant theory and the measures of
OA cannot be directly assessed. This dataset was not created to test specific hypotheses and the
measures calculated by CN are atheoretical in nature. The measures used in the quantitative
study closely approximate the original concepts of exploration and exploitation popularized by
March (1991), but the ratio measures themselves lack the ability to calculate reliability statistics
(Crook et al., 2010). Only future longitudinal studies would be able to determine where each of
these organizations are in a particular cycle of exploration or exploitation. The present study
looks at a cross-sectional slice of the CN data to describe the relationship between OC, OE, and
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FP, but future studies may find it valuable to examine lagged timeframes such as examining
whether surpluses in earlier years lead to longer periods of positive financial performance. The
high degree of multicollinearity seen between the independent variables (OC and OE) and FP
raises questions about how to conduct research in the NFP sector that generalizes beyond
singular studies when the only extant measures that permit interorganizational comparison are
financial in nature and drawn from the same IRS filings. Due to the strong positive relationships
seen between OC and OA as measured in this study, the findings reported to test hypothesis 3
should be interpreted with caution. Until additional performance measures are introduced that
permit comparison between NFPs, research methods such as case studies, surveys of
idiosyncratic measures, and interviews are likely to remain the methods of choice for
organizational researchers in the NFP sector. The use of IRS Form 990 data as either an
independent or dependent variable, although convenient and translatable across organizations,
leaves little room for other financial measures in a research study. Future research in this area
will hopefully result in other measures that are internally consistent and generalizable.
Second, the goal of capturing the entire CN dataset is a moving target, as new IRS-990
filings are reported annually. With a long enough time horizon, longitudinal analysis of this data
may be able to better detect cycles of exploration and exploitation as well as overall periods of
growth and decline for charitable giving. Collecting more data will likely improve our
understanding of concepts such as reciprocal ambidexterity (Simsek et al., 2009), but researchers
must be sure that the system to calculate ratings has not changed drastically. One example of this
caveat is that CN has refined its own rating systems. In 2012, CN began using a new rating
methodology to translate the ratios from IRS-990 filings into their ratings for exploration and
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exploitation (charitynavigator.com). Consequently, comparing ratings between different periods
will be quite difficult. Future research will need to assess the level of agreement between pre2012 ratings and post-2012 ratings to determine how to incorporate both of these periods into a
longitudinal research design.
In addition to comparisons between these different measurement methods over different
periods, another way to develop a more complete picture of NFP performance would be through
triangulation with other NFP rating agencies. Although CN looks exclusively at financial figures
provided to the IRS, other rating agencies such as GuideStar, the Better Business Bureau,
LiveWell.org, and GreatNonprofits.org consider perceptual appraisals from various stakeholders
including volunteers, donors, and industry experts when developing their assessment of NFP
performance. Attempting to integrate a dataset that incorporates a variety of different measures
of performance will likely reduce the overall sample size given that organizations with missing
data on one or more dimension will no longer be included for analysis. Despite this potential
shortcoming, the ability to correlate different measures of performance may outweigh the
limitation of a reduced sample size.
Third, this study looks broadly at the entire NFP sector, as well as narrowly on a sample
of organizations from one industry within it. The insights gained from the interviews and site
visits to four food banks may not generalize to other contexts within the NFP sector or back to
their for-profit counterparts. Because many of the organizations reported in the CN dataset are
members of a larger organization (e.g., Habitat for Humanity, United Way, Girl Scouts), the
findings from this study may offer suggestions to these types of organizations that need
refinement to be meaningful in a more competitive for-profit setting. The inherently non95

competitive nature of the food banks studied suggests that translating the network learning
findings to a for-profit context may be difficult. Rather than contact counterparts within the same
industry, organizations trying to leverage learning relationships may need to look to adjacent
industries with similar functions but indirect competition.
Future research in this area may want to consider how NFPs in non-affiliate settings
attempt to leverage networks to which they do have access. Some questions to consider are how
NFPs partner with other organizations such as universities to improve their ability to explore new
options. The concept of partitional ambidexterity (Simsek et al., 2009) suggests that NFPs may
be able to engage in ambidextrous operations by partnering with structurally-distinct entities. In
the present study, food banks are using alliances and outsourcing relationships that are not
reported in the CN dataset. Research methods such as social network analysis could use data
from websites such as muckity.com to trace relationships through funding networks, alumni
networks, or boards of directors. The implication that many of the organizations in this study
found new ideas from other branches within their network, rather than from a top-down
hierarchy (Plowman et al., 2007), suggests that this type of structure may need more networkbased methods to gather and analyze data. Despite these limitations, the possibility to understand
some of these unanswered questions makes this topic one worthy of further investigation.
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Chapter 6 - Conclusion
The need to engage in exploration and exploitation activities will continue to present
challenges to managers who must find ways to refine existing competencies without falling prey
to the competency trap (Levinthal & March, 1993; Liu, 2006) or engaging so heavily in
innovation and novel strategies that they actually steer their organization into a failure trap
(March, 1991; March, 2003). This study begins to look at how the relationship between these
two types of behaviors is related to financial performance within the unique context of NFPs.
These organizations do not exist to maximize owner or shareholder value (Sherlock & Gravelle,
2009), but face even more stringent constraints than their for-profit counterparts due to the
stakeholder focus on efficiency and the narrow mission focus. The previous ambidexterity
studies that have looked at single industries have tended to find strong positive support for
ambidexterity, yet this study was unable to replicate those findings across a broad, multi-industry
sample of NFPs. These mixed results suggest that measures of ambidexterity may strongly
influence the relationship between exploitation, exploration, and financial performance. Three
key factors that facilitated ambidextrous operations emerged from the qualitative analysis of
interviews with executive directors at a sample of food banks: embracing professionalism,
knowledge exchange, and leadership.
These food banks provide examples of organizations that can undergo changes to their
bureaucratic structure and identity, while continuing to engage in a new and innovative ways of
meeting their stated mission. Additionally, the food banks leveraged two different network levels
to minimize the risks associated with innovation by watching others refine new programs first,
then exploiting second-mover advantages (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988) in order to
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transplant successful programs to their home territory. Finally, an enabling culture of leadership
between Feeding America, the boards of directors, and top managers allowed high-performing
employees to create new ideas and disseminate them across the network. NFPs provide a unique
context for understanding how organizations engage in OA in resource-constrained environments
with highly specific missions. Understanding how these collaborative organizations function as
an interdependent network of ideas and talent may foster the growth of new ideas for improving
performance in their for-profit counterparts as well.

98

References

99

Abernathy, W. J. 1978. The productivity dilemma: Roadblock to innovation in the automobile
industry. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Adler, P. S. 1993. Time-and-motion regained. Harvard Business Review, 71(1): 97-108.
Adler, P. S., Goldoftas, B., & Levine, D. I. 1999. Flexibility versus efficiency? A case study of
model changeovers in the Toyota production system. Organization Science: 10: 43-68.
Adler, P.S., Benner, M., Brunner, D.J., MacDuffie, J.P., Osono, E., Staats, B.R., Takeuchi, H.,
Tushman, M.L., & Winter, S.G. 2009. Perspectives on the productivity dilemma. Journal
of Operations Management, 27(2): 99-113.
Ambrosini, V., Bowman, C., & Schoenberg, R. 2011. Should acquiring firms pursue more than
one value creation strategy? An empirical test of acquisition performance. British
Journal of Management, 22(1): 173-185.
Andreoni, J., & Payne, A. A. 2011. Is crowding out due entirely to fundraising? Evidence from a
panel of charities. Journal of Public Economics, 95: 334-343.
Andriopoulos, C., & Lewis, M.W. 2009. Exploitation-exploration tensions and organizational
ambidexterity: Managing paradoxes of innovation. Organization Science, 20: 696-717.
Atuahene-Gima, K. 2005. Resolving the capability-rigidity paradox in new product innovation.
Journal of Marketing, 69: 61-83.
Auh, S., & Menguc, B. 2005. Balancing exploration and exploitation: The moderating role of
competitive intensity. Journal of Business Research, 58: 1652-1661.
Austin, J., Stevenson, H., & Wei‐Skillern, J. 2006. Social and commercial entrepreneurship:
Same, different, or both? Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 30: 1-22.

100

Balser, D., & McClusky, J. 2005. Managing stakeholder relationships and nonprofit organization
effectiveness. Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 15: 295-315.
Bartlett, C. A., & Ghoshal, S. 1986. Tap your subsidiaries for global reach. Harvard Business
Review, 64(6): 87-94.
Beckman, C. M. 2006. The influence of founding team company affiliations on firm behavior.
Academy of Management Journal, 49: 741-758.
Benner, M. J., & Tushman, M. L. 2003. Exploitation, exploration, and process management: The
productivity dilemma revisited. Academy of Management Review, 28: 238-256.
Bhargava, S., & Sinha, B. 1992. Prediction of organizational effectiveness as a function of type
of organizational structure. Journal of Social Psychology, 132: 223-231.
Bierly, P. E., & Daly, P. S. 2007. Alternative knowledge strategies, competitive environment,
and organizational performance in small manufacturing firms. Entrepreneurship Theory
and Practice, 31: 493-516.
Birkinshaw, J. M. 1997. Entrepreneurship in multinational corporations: The characteristics of
subsidiary initiatives. Strategic Management Journal, 18: 207-229.
Birkinshaw, J. M., Hood, N., & Jonsson, S. 1998. Building firm-specific advantages in
multinational corporations: The role of subsidiary initiative. Strategic Management
Journal, 19: 221-241.
Boris, E., & Steuerle, E. 1999. What charities cannot do. The Christian Science Monitor, 1 Oct.
1999, 11.

101

Bowman, H. W., Tuckman, H., & Young, D. 2010. How nonprofit organizations manage
financial surpluses and why it matters. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the
International Society for Third-Sector Research, Istanbul.
Bowman, W., 2011. Financial capacity and sustainability of ordinary nonprofits. Nonprofit
Management and Leadership, 22: 37-51.
Brown, T. J., Dacin, P. A., Pratt, M. G., & Whetten, D. A. 2006. Identity, intended image,
construed image, and reputation: An interdisciplinary framework and suggested
terminology. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 34: 99-106.
Burgelman, R. A. 1991. Intraorganizational ecology of strategy making and organizational
adaptation: Theory and field research. Organization Science, 2: 239-262.
Burgelman, R. A. 1983. A model of the interaction of strategic behavior, corporate context, and
the concept of strategy. Academy of Management Review: 8: 61-70.
Calás, M. B., Smircich, L., & Bourne, K. A. 2009. Extending the boundaries: Reframing
“entrepreneurship as social change” through feminist perspectives. Academy of
Management Review, 34: 552-569.
Cameron, K. S. 1986. Effectiveness as paradox: Consensus and conflict in conceptions of
organizational effectiveness. Management Science, 32: 539-553.
Carmeli, A., & Halevi, M. Y. 2009. How top management team behavioral integration and
behavioral complexity enable organizational ambidexterity: The moderating role of
contextual ambidexterity. The Leadership Quarterly, 20: 207-218.
Chang, Y. Y., & Hughes, M. 2012. Drivers of innovation ambidexterity in small- to mediumsized firms. European Management Journal, 30(1): 1-17.
102

Cohen, J. 1992. A power primer. Psychological Bulletin, 112: 155-159.
Cole, R. E., & Matsumiya, T. 2007. Too much of a good thing? Quality as an impediment to
innovation. California Management Review, 50(1): 77-93.
Crook, T. R., Shook, C. L., Morris, M. L., & Madden, T. M. 2010. Are we there yet? An
assessment of research design and construct measurement practices in entrepreneurship
research. Organizational Research Methods, 13: 192-206.
Dart R. 2004. The legitimacy of social enterprise. Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 14:
411-424.
De Geus, A. 2002. The living company. Boston, MA: Harvard Business Press.
Dees, J. G. 1998. Enterprising nonprofits. Harvard Business Review, 76(1): 54-69.
Dees, J. G. 2007. Taking social entrepreneurship seriously. Society, 44(3): 24-31.
Duncan, R. 1976. The ambidextrous organization: Designing dual structures for innovation. In R.
H. Killman, L. R. Pondy, & D. Sleven (Eds.), The Management of Organization, 167188. New York: North Holland.
Dutton, J. E., & Dukerich, J. M. 1991. Keeping an eye on the mirror: Image and identity in
organizational adaptation. Academy of Management Journal, 34: 517-554.
Dutton, J. E., Ashford, S. J., O’Neill, R. M., & Lawrence, K. A. 2001. Moves that matter: Issue
selling and organizational change. Academy of Management Journal, 44: 716-736.
Ebben, J. J., & Johnson, A. C. 2005. Efficiency, flexibility, or both? Evidence linking strategy to
performance in small firms. Strategic Management Journal, 26: 1249-1259.

103

Edmondson, A. C. 1996. Learning from mistakes is easier said than done: Group and
organizational influences on the detection and correction of human error. Journal of
Applied Behavioral Science, 32: 5-28.
Eisenhardt, K. M., & Martin, J. A. 2000. Dynamic capabilities: What are they? Strategic
Management Journal, 21: 1105-1121.
Eisenhardt, K. M., Furr, N. R., & Bingham, C. B. 2010. Microfoundations of performance:
Balancing efficiency and flexibility in dynamic environments. Organization Science, 21:
1263-1273.
Etter, L., & Jargon, J. 2007 May 22. Food banks go hungry. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved
April 21, 2012 from http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117979110592110150.html
Floyd, S. W., & Lane, P. J. 2000. Strategizing throughout the organization: Managing role
conflict in strategic renewal. Academy of Management Review, 25: 154-177.
Freeman, J., Carroll, G. R., & Hannan, M. T. 1983. The liability of newness: Age dependence in
organizational death rates. American Sociological Review, 48: 692-710.
Freeman, R. E. 1983. Stockholders and stakeholders: A new perspective in corporate
governance. California Management Review, 25(3): 88-106.
Fremont-Smith, M.R. 2004. Accumulations of wealth by nonprofits. Harvard University Hauser
Center for Nonprofit Organizations.
Geller, S. L., Abramson, A. J., & de Leon, E. 2010. The nonprofit technology gap: Myth or
reality? Listening Post Project. 20.
Ghoshal, S., & Bartlett, C. A. 1994. Linking organizational context and managerial action: The
dimensions of quality of management. Strategic Management Journal, 15(S2): 91-112.
104

Gibson, C. B., & Birkinshaw, J. M. 2004a. Contextual determinants of organizational
ambidexterity. Academy of Management Journal, 47: 209-226.
Gibson, C. B., & Birkinshaw, J. M. 2004b. The antecedents, consequences, and mediating role of
organizational ambidexterity. Academy of Management Journal, 47: 209-226.
Gilbreth, F. B., & Gilbreth, L. M. 1919. Fatigue study. London: Routledge.
Ginsberg, A., & Buchholtz, A. 1990. Converting to for-profit status: Corporate responsiveness to
radical change. Academy of Management Journal, 33: 445-477.
Gordon, T. P., Knock, C. L., & Neely, D. G. 2009. The role of rating agencies in the market for
charitable contributions: An empirical test. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,
28: 469-484.
Gupta, A. K., Smith, K. G., & Shalley, C. E. 2006. The interplay between exploration and
exploitation. Academy of Management Journal, 4: 693-706.
Han, M. 2005. Towards strategic ambidexterity: The nexus of pro-profit and pro-growth for
corporate venturing. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Academy of
Management, Honolulu.
Han, J. K., Kim, N., & Kim, H. B. 2001. Entry barriers: A dull-, one-, or two-edged sword for
incumbents? Unraveling the paradox from a contingency perspective. Journal of
Marketing, 65: 1-14.
He, Z. L., & Wong, P. K. 2004. Exploration vs. exploitation: An empirical test of the
ambidexterity hypothesis. Organization Science, 15: 481-494.
Herman, R. D., Renz, D. O., & Heimovics, R. D. 1996. Board practices and board effectiveness
in local nonprofit organizations. Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 7: 373-385.
105

Herman, R. D., & Renz, D. O. 1998. Nonprofit organizational effectiveness: Contrasts between
especially effective and less effective organizations. Nonprofit Management and
Leadership, 9: 23-38.
Herman, R. D., & Renz, D. O. 1999. Theses on nonprofit organizational effectiveness. Nonprofit
and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 28: 107-126.
Hill, S. A., & Birkinshaw, J. M. 2006. Ambidexterity in corporate venturing: Simultaneously
using existing and building new capabilities. Academy of Management Annual Meeting
Proceedings: C1-C6.
Howell, J. M., & Boies, K. 2004. Champions of technological innovation: The influence of
contextual knowledge, role orientation, idea generation and idea promotion on champion
emergence. The Leadership Quarterly, 15: 123-143.
Hwang, H., & Powell, W. W. 2009. The rationalization of charity: The influences of
professionalism in the nonprofit sector. Administrative Science Quarterly, 54: 268-298.
Ivankova, N. V., Creswell, J. W., & Stick, S. L. 2006. Using mixed-methods sequential
explanatory design: From theory to practice. Field Methods, 18: 3-20.
Jansen, J. J. P., Tempelaar, M. P., Van Den Bosch, F. A. J., & Volberda, H. W. 2009. Structural
differentiation and ambidexterity: The mediating role of integration mechanisms.
Organization Science, 20: 797-811.
Jansen, J. J. P., Van Den Bosch, A. J., Volberda, H. W. 2006. Exploratory innovation,
exploitative innovation, and performance: Effects of organizational antecedents and
environmental moderators. Management Science, 11: 1661-1674.

106

Jasmand, C., Blazevic, V., & de Ruyter, K. 2012. Generating sales while providing service: A
study of customer service representatives' ambidextrous behavior. Journal of Marketing,
76: 20-37.
Jonsson, A., & Foss, N. J. 2011. International expansion through flexible replication: Learning
from the internationalization experience of IKEA. Journal of International Business
Studies, 42: 1079-1102.
Kaplan, R. S. 2001. Strategic performance measurement and management in nonprofit
organizations. Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 11: 353-370.
Kaplan, R. S., & Grossman, A. S. 2010. The emerging capital market for nonprofits. Harvard
Business Review, 88(10): 111-118.
Katila, R., & Ahuja, G. 2002. Something old, something new: A longitudinal study of search
behavior and new product introduction. Academy of Management Journal, 45: 11831194.
Kauffman, S. 1995. At home in the universe: The search for laws of self-organization and
complexity. New York: Oxford University Press.
Kerlinger, F. N., & Lee, H. B. 1999. Foundations of behavioral research. Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth.
Korosec, R. L., & Berman, E. M. 2006. Municipal support for social entrepreneurship. Public
Administration Review, 66: 448–462.
Kostopoulos, K. C., & Bozionelos, N. 2011. Team exploratory and exploitative learning:
Psychological safety, task conflict, and team performance. Group & Organization
Management, 36: 385-415.
107

Kushner, R. J., & Poole, P. P. 1996. Exploring structure effectiveness relationships in nonprofit
arts organizations. Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 7: 119-136.
Kwee, Z., Van Den Bosch, F. A. J., & Volberda, H. W. 2011. The influence of top management
team's corporate governance orientation on strategic renewal trajectories: A longitudinal
analysis of Royal Dutch Shell PLC, 1907-2004. Journal of Management Studies, 48:
984-1014.
Kyriakopoulos, K., & Moorman, C. 2004. Tradeoffs in marketing exploitation and exploration
strategies: The overlooked role of market orientation. International Journal of Research
in Marketing, 21: 219-240.
Lavie, D., & Rosenkopf, L. 2006. Balancing exploration and exploitation in alliance formation.
Academy of Management Journal, 49: 797-818.
Lavie, D., Kang, J., & Rosenkopf, L. 2011. Balance within and across domains: The
performance implications of exploration and exploitation in alliances. Organization
Science, 22: 1517-1538.
Leonard-Barton, D. 1992. Core capabilities and core rigidities: A paradox in managing new
product development. Strategic Management Journal, 13: 111-125.
Levinthal, D. A., & March, J. G. 1981. A model of adaptive organizational search. Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization, 2: 307-333.
Levinthal, D. A., & March, J. G. 1993. The myopia of learning. Strategic Management Journal,
14: 95-112.
Levinthal, D. A., & Myatt, J. 1994. Co‐evolution of capabilities and industry: the evolution of
mutual fund processing. Strategic Management Journal, 15: 45-62.
108

Levitt, B., & March, J. G. 1988. Organizational learning. Annual Review of Sociology, 14: 319340.
Li, H., & Atuahene-Gima, K. 2001. Product innovation strategy and the performance of new
technology ventures in China. Academy of Management Journal, 44: 1123-1134.
Lichtenstein, B. B., Uhl-Bien, M., Marion, R., Seers, A., Orton, J. D., & Schreiber, C. 2006.
Complexity leadership theory: An interactive perspective on leading in complex adaptive
systems. Emergence: Complexity in Organizations, 8: 2-12.
Lieberman, M. B., & Montgomery, D. B. 1988. First‐mover advantages. Strategic Management
Journal, 9(S1): 41-58.
Lin, Z., Yang, H., & Demirkan, I. 2007. The performance consequences of ambidexterity in
strategic alliance formations: Empirical investigation and computational theorizing.
Management Science, 53: 1645-1658.
Liu, W. 2006. Knowledge exploitation, knowledge exploration, and competency trap.
Knowledge and Process Management, 13: 144-161.
Lubatkin, M. H., Simsek, Z., Ling, Y., & Veiga, J. F. 2006. Ambidexterity and performance in
small-to medium-sized firms: The pivotal role of top management team behavioral
integration. Journal of Management, 32: 646-672.
March, J. G. 1991. Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning. Organization
Science, 2: 71-87.
March, J. G. 2003. Understanding organisational adaptation. Society and Economy, 25: 1-10.
Messick, S. 1988. Test Validity. New York: Routledge.

109

Mom, T. J. M., Van Den Bosch, F. A. J., & Volberda, H. W. 2009. Understanding variation in
managers' ambidexterity: Investigating direct and interaction effects of formal structural
and personal coordination mechanisms. Organization Science, 20: 812-828.
Murnighan, J. K., Kim, J. W., & Metzger, A. R. 1993. The volunteer dilemma. Administrative
Science Quarterly, 38: 515-538.
Novak, J. M. & Sellnow, T. L. 2009. Reducing organizational risk through participatory
communication. Journal of Applied Communication Research, 37: 349-373.
O'Reilly, C. A., & Tushman, M. L. 2004. The ambidextrous organization. Harvard Business
Review, 82(4): 74-81.
O’Reilly, C. A., & Tushman, M. L. 2008. Ambidexterity as a dynamic capability: Resolving the
innovator’s dilemma. Research in Organizational Behavior, 28: 185-206.
O'Reilly, C. A., & Tushman, M. L. 2011. Organizational ambidexterity in action: How managers
explore and exploit. California Management Review, 53(4): 5-22.
Pfeffer, J. 2005. Changing mental models: HR’s most important task. Human Resource
Management, 44: 123-128.
Pfeffer, J. 2010. Building sustainable organizations: The human factor. Academy of
Management Perspectives, 24: 34-45.
Piao, M. 2010. Thriving in the new: Implication of exploration on organizational longevity.
Journal of Management, 36: 1529-1554.
Plowman, D. A., & Duchon, D. 2008. Dispelling the myths about leadership. In M. Uhl-Bien &
R. Marion (Eds.), Complexity leadership: Conceptual foundations, 129-153. Charlotte,
NC: Information Age Publishing.
110

Plowman, D. A., Baker, L. T., Beck, T. E., Kulkarni, M., Solansky, S. T., & Travis, D. V. 2007.
Radical change accidentally: The emergence and amplification of small change.
Academy of Management Journal, 50: 515-543.
Probst, G., & Raisch, S. 2005. Organizational crisis: The logic of failure. Academy of
Management Executive, 19: 90-105.
Quinn, R. E., & Rohrbaugh, J. 1983. A spatial model of effectiveness criteria: Towards a
competing values approach to organizational analysis. Management Science, 29: 363377.
Quinn, R. E., & Spreitzer, G. M. 1991. The psychometrics of the competing values culture
instrument and an analysis of the impact of organizational culture on quality of life.
Research in Organizational Change and Development, 5: 115-142.
Raisch, S., & Birkinshaw, J. M. 2008. Organizational ambidexterity: Antecedents, outcomes, and
moderators. Journal of Management, 34: 375-409.
Raisch, S., Birkinshaw, J. M., Probst, G., & Tushman, M. L. 2009. Organizational ambidexterity:
Balancing exploitation and exploration for sustained performance. Organization Science,
20: 685-695.
Revilla E., Prieto, I. M., & Rodriguez, B. 2011. Information technology and the ambidexterity
hypothesis: An analysis in product development. Journal of Operations and Supply
Chain Management, 4: 1-18.
Ritchie, W. J., & Kolodinsky, R. W. 2003. Nonprofit organization financial performance
measurement: An evaluation of new and existing financial performance measures.
Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 13: 367-381.
111

Rivkin, J. W., & Siggelkow, N. 2003. Balancing search and stability: Interdependencies among
elements organizational design. Management Science, 49: 290-311.
Rojas, R. R. 2000. A review of models for measuring organizational effectiveness among for
profit and nonprofit organizations. Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 11: 97-104.
Rosenthal, R. 1979. The file drawer problem and tolerance for null results. Psychological
Bulletin, 86: 638-641.
Rothaermel, F. T., & Deeds, D. L. 2004. Exploration and exploitation alliances in biotechnology:
A system of new product development. Strategic Management Journal, 25: 201-221.
Ruef, M. 2002. Strong ties, weak ties and islands: Structural and cultural predictors of
organizational innovation. Industrial and Corporate Change, 11: 427-449.
Rugman, A. M., & Verbeke, A. 1992. A note on the transnational solution and the transaction
cost theory of multinational strategic management. Journal of International Business
Studies, 23: 761-771.
Rushing, W. 1974. Differences in profit and nonprofit organizations: A study of effectiveness
and efficiency in general short-stay hospitals. Administrative Science Quarterly, 19: 474484.
Russo, M. V. 1992. Power plays: Regulation, diversification, and backward integration in the
electric utility industry. Strategic Management Journal, 13: 13-27.
Ryan, W. P. 1999. The landscape for nonprofits. Harvard Business Review, 77(1): 127-137.
Salamon, L. M. 1995. Partners in public service: Government-nonprofit relations in the
modern welfare state. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

112

Salamon, L. M., Geller, S. L., & Mengel, K. L. 2010. Nonprofits, innovation, and performance
measurement: Separating fact from fiction. Listening Post Project, 17.
Sawhill, J. C., & Williamson, D. 2001. Mission impossible? Measuring success in nonprofit
organizations. Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 11: 371-386.
Schriesheim, C. A., Cogliser, C. C., Scandura, T. A., Lankau, M. J., & Powers, K. J. 1999. An
empirical comparison of approaches for quantitatively assessing the content adequacy of
paper-and-pencil measurement instruments. Organizational Research Methods, 2: 140156.
Seo, H., Kim, J. Y., & Yang, S. U. 2009. Global activism and new media: A study of
transnational NGOs' online public relations. Public Relations Review, 35: 123-126.
Sherlock, M. F., & Gravelle, J. G. 2009. Overview of the nonprofit and charitable sector.
Technical Report R40919, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC.
Siciliano, J. I. 1996. The relationship between formal planning and performance in nonprofit
organizations. Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 7: 387-403.
Siggelkow, N., & Rivkin, J. W. 2006. When exploration backfires: Unintended consequences of
multilevel organizational search. Academy of Management Journal, 49: 779-795.
Simsek, Z. 2009. Organizational ambidexterity: Towards a multilevel understanding. Journal of
Management Studies, 46: 597-624.
Simsek, Z., Heavey, C., Veiga, J. F., & Souder, D. 2009. A typology for aligning organizational
ambidexterity's conceptualizations, antecedents, and outcomes. Journal of Management
Studies, 46: 864-894.

113

Sirén, C. A., Kohtamäki, M., & Kuckertz, A. 2012. Exploration and exploitation strategies, profit
performance, and the mediating role of strategic learning: Escaping the exploitation trap.
Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, 6: 18-41.
Smith, S. R., & Lipsky, M. 1995. Nonprofits for hire: The welfare state in the age of
contracting. Boston, MA: Harvard University Press.
Sørensen, J. B., & Stuart, T. E. 2000. Aging, obsolescence, and organizational innovation.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 45: 81-112.
Speckbacher, G. 2003. The economics of performance management in nonprofit organizations.
Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 13: 267-281.
Speckbacher, G. 2008. Nonprofit versus corporate governance: An economic approach.
Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 18: 295-320.
Steers, R. M. 1975. Problems in the measurement of organizational effectiveness. Administrative
Science Quarterly, 20: 546-558.
Stone, M. M., & Crittenden, W. 1993. A guide to journal articles on strategic management in
nonprofit organizations, 1977 to 1992. Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 4: 193213.
Sun, P. Y. T., & Anderson, M. H. 2012. The combined influence of top and middle management
leadership styles on absorptive capacity. Management Learning, 43: 25-51.
Sutton, R. I., & Rafaeli, A. 1988. Untangling the relationship between displayed emotions and
organizational sales: The case of convenience stores. Academy of Management Journal,
31: 461-487.

114

Szper, R., & Prakash, A. 2011. Charity watchdogs and the limits of information-based
regulation. Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations,
22: 112-141.
Tan, W-L., Williams, J., & Tan, T-M. 2005. Defining the “social” in “social entrepreneurship”:
Altruism and entrepreneurship. International Entrepreneurship and Management
Journal, 1: 358-365.
Tarafdar, M., & Gordon, S. R. 2007. Understanding the influence of information systems
competencies on process innovation: A resource-based view. Journal of Strategic
Information Systems, 16: 353-392.
Taylor, F. W. 1911. The principles of scientific management. Norwood, MA: Plimpton Press.
Teece, D. J., Pisano, G., & Shuen, A. 1997. Dynamic capabilities and strategic management.
Strategic Management Journal, 18: 509-533.
Thongpapanl, N., De Clercq, D., & Dimov, D. 2012. An investigation of the performance
consequences of alignment and adaptability: Contingency effects of decision autonomy
and shared responsibility. R & D Management, 42(1): 14-30.
Tinkelman, D. 2009. Unintended consequences of expense ratio guidelines: The Avon breast
cancer walks. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 28(6): 485-494.
Tiwana, A. 2008. Do bridging ties complement strong ties? An empirical examination of alliance
ambidexterity. Strategic Management Journal, 29: 251-272.
Tushman, M. L., & O’Reilly, C. A. 1996. Ambidextrous organizations: Managing evolutionary
and revolutionary change. California Management Review, 38(4): 8-30.

115

Uhl-Bien, M., & Marion, R. 2009. Complexity leadership in bureaucratic forms of organizing: A
meso model. The Leadership Quarterly, 20: 631-650.
Uhl-Bien, M., Marion, R., & McKelvey, B. 2007. Complexity leadership theory: Shifting
leadership from the industrial age to the knowledge era. The Leadership Quarterly, 18:
298-318.
Uotila, J., Maula, M., Keil, T., & Zahra, S. A. 2009. Exploration, exploitation, and financial
performance: Analysis of S&P 500 corporations. Strategic Management Journal, 30:
221-231.
Van Slyke, D. M. 2007. Agents or stewards: Using theory to understand the governmentnonprofit social service contracting relationship. Journal of Public Administration
Research and Theory, 17: 157-187.
Venkatraman, N., Lee, C. H., & Iyer, B. 2007. Strategic ambidexterity and sales growth: A
longitudinal test in the software sector. Unpublished Manuscript (earlier version
presented at the Academy of Management Meeting, 2005).
Weigelt, C., & Sarkar, M. B. 2012. Performance implications of outsourcing for technological
innovations: Managing the efficiency and adaptability trade-off. Strategic Management
Journal, 33: 189-216.
Zammuto, R. F. 1984. A comparison of multiple constituency models of organizational
effectiveness. Academy of Management Review, 9: 606-616.

116

Appendix
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Exploration

Quadrant 3:
Growth Focus through
New Products / Markets

Quadrant 4:
Organizational
Ambidexterity

Quadrant 1:
No Discernible
Ambidexterity
Competencies

Quadrant 2:
Efficiency Focus through
Refinement

Exploitation
Figure 1 presents the 2x2 matrix of organizational classifications that result from examining
organizations that engage in high and low levels of exploration and exploitation.

Figure 1: Organizational Ambidexterity Classification by Exploration and Exploitation

118

Figure 2 presents Charity Navigator data as website users see it. IRS Form-990 data is parsed
and displayed for donors, volunteers, and managers. Statistical analysis cannot be performed on
the data in its current state.

Figure 2: Charity Navigator Data Source Example
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Figure 3 presents the Visual Web Ripper interface used for extracting data in order to conduct
statistical analysis on the variables of interest.

Figure 3: Visual Web Ripper Data Extraction Example
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Figure 4 presents the four site food bank sites on the basis of their Charity Navigator exploration and exploitation ratings.

Figure 44: Scatter Plot of Food Bank Interview Sites
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`

Figure 5 presents the IRB approval necessary to engage in human subjects research and conduct
interviews with participants.

Figure 5: Institutional Review Board Approval
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`

Figure 6 presents the IRB-approved informed consent statement that each interviewee received
and signed prior to participating in any in this study.

Figure 6: Human Subjects Informed Consent Statement
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`
Describe your career path.
How long have you worked for this organization? Did you work at an organization before this
one? How is this company different?
If you have worked in for-profit before this, what are some differences you’ve seen between
the two?
What do you think for-profits can learn from not-for-profits and vice versa?
How would you describe a very successful not-for-profit organization?
Can you tell me about a successful growth initiative that you know of here?
Can you tell me about a failed growth initiative that you know of here?
Are there any programs that you would like to see added?
Are there any programs that should probably be eliminated?
Do you see your organization continuing to expand into other areas of the region or country?
Would you want it to?
Which places do you think would be likely targets for expansion?
Can you think of any major turning points in the history of this organization?
Are people more interested in trying new things or focusing on things that have been
successful in the past?
If you had to divide the time you spend on daily tasks into five different buckets, what would
those look like?
What metrics do you use to define organization performance? Are those benchmarked against
other organizations?
Are you familiar with any of the rating NFP rating agencies? How do people here feel about
them?
How does this chapter interact with other chapters within the system?
Are there other major organizations that you partner with? What do they do for your
organization?
Can you think of anything we haven’t covered that I should know about your organization?

Figure 7 presents the interview protocol used to assess concepts of exploration and exploitation
with food bank executive directors and other senior staff members.

Figure 7: Interview Protocol
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Table 1: Quantitative Impacts of Organizational Ambidexterity on Performance
Sample /
Industry

MixedMethod

MultiIndustry

Performance
Impacts

Not
specified

Yes

Yes

+

Work unit
effectiveness

Survey

Korea

No

No

+

Market share and
ROI

No

No

+

Number of new
products introduced

Citation

Year

N

Method

McDonough &
Leifer

1983

21

Manufacturing
and insurance

Interviews
and surveys

Han et al.

2001

127

Consumer
products

Country /
Region

Performance
Outcomes

Katila & Ahuja

2002

124

Robotics

Archival

Europe,
Japan, and
North
America

Kyriakopoulos
& Moorman

2004

96

Packaged food
business units

Survey

Netherlands

No

No

+

Rothaermel &
Deeds

2004

325

Biotechnology

Archival

Global

No

No

+

He & Wong

2004

206

Manufacturing

Survey

Singapore
and Penang

No

No

+

Auh & Menguc

2005

260

Manufacturing

Survey

Australia

No

No

+

Atuahene-Gima

2005

227

Electronics

Interviews
and surveys

China

Yes

No

+

Han

2005

2

Merrill Lynch
and Comdirect
Bank

Case study

United
States

No

No

+

International
sustainability

Lubatkin et al.

2006

139

SMEs

Survey

United
States

No

Yes

+

Growth and
profitability

Jansen et al.

2006

283

Financial
services

Survey

Europe

No

No

+

Average
profitability

Bierly and Daly

2007

98

SME
manufacturers

Survey

Global

No

No

n.s.

Financial
performance
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New product
financial
performance
More products on
the market and in
development
Sales growth
Profit, market share,
and sales growth
Radical innovation
performance

Table 1. Continued.
Revilla et al.
CegarraNevarro &
Dewhurst
Venkatraman et
al.
Lin, Yang, and
Demirkan

2011

80

Product
development

Survey

Spain

No

Yes

+

New product
development

2007

269

SMEs

Survey

Spain

No

Yes

+

Customer capital

2007

1005

Software

Global

No

No

+

Sales growth

2007

5

United
States

Yes

Yes

n.s.

Multi-industry

Longitudinal
archival
Archival and
simulation

Net sales / current
assets
Firm performance
scale: sales growth,
profit growth, share
growth, reputation

Cao,
Gedajlovic, &
Zhang

2009

122

High-tech

Survey

China

No

Yes

+

Rothaermel &
Alexandre

2009

141

Random, multiindustry

Archival

Archival

No

Yes

curvilinear

Firm performance

2009

474

Academic
patents

Survey

Taiwan

No

Yes

+

Academic research
commercialization

2010

1500

FDA drug
approvals

Archival

United
States

No

No

+

Breakthrough drugs

2011

108

Information
Technology

Archival

India

No

No

+

Operational and
financial
performance

2011

142

Pharmaceuticals

Survey

UK, Italy,
Greece

No

No

+

Team performance

2011

265

SMEs

Survey

Scotland

Yes

No

+

Firm performance

Ambrosini et al.

2011

130

Multi-industry

Survey

UK

No

Yes

-

Acquisition
performance

Thongpapanl et
al.

2012

200

Multi-industry

Survey

Canada

No

Yes

+

Financial
performance

Chang, Yang,
and Chen
DunlapHinkler,
Kotabe, &
Mudambi
Sanyal & Sett
Kostopoulos &
Bozionelos
Chang, Hughes,
& Hotho
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Table 2: Partial Correlation Matrix with Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Fiscal Performance (FP)
Exploration
Exploitation
Ambidexterity
Organization Age
Organization Size (log)

1.01
19.67
33.38
667.81
53.36
15.80

0.39
7.65
6.00
298.51
42.55
1.92

1
0.19***
0.06***
0.18***
-0.11***
-0.01

Note: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10
n = 5,450
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1
0.24***
0.93***
0.01
0.17***

1
0.55***
-0.03†
0.05***

1
-0.01
0.16***

1
0.35***

1

Table 3: Full Correlation Matrix with Industries
Variable Name

Variable #

1

Fiscal Performance

1

1.00

2

Exploration

2

.19*

1.00

Exploitation

3

.05*

.25*

1.00

Organizational Ambidexterity

4

.18*

.93*

.55*

Organizational Age

5

-.11*

.01

-.03

-.01

1.00

Organizational Size (log)

6

-.01

.17*

.05*

.16*

.35*

Animal Rights

7

.01

.07*

-.02

.05*

.09*

.00

1.00

Wildlife Conservation

8

.04*

.00

-.01

-.01 -.05*

-.01

-.03

1.00

Zoos and Aquariums

9

.02

.03

.01

.03

.04*

.04*

-.02

-.01

1.00

Libraries

10

-.01

-.02 -.05* -.04* .09*

.07*

-.02

-.01

-.01

1.00

Museums

11

-.01 -.03* -.08* -.06* .09*

.14* -.05*

-.03

-.02

-.03

Performing Arts

12

-.02 -.08*

-.02 -.08*

.04* -.05* -.03*

-.03

-.03 -.05*

Public Broadcasting

13

-.01

-.02

.01

-.02 -.05*

-.02 -.03*

-.02

-.01

-.01 -.03* -.03*

Private Elementary / Secondary

14

-.02 -.03*

.02

-.03 -.08* -.03* -.05*

-.03

-.02

-.02 -.05*

Private Liberal Arts Colleges

15

-.02

.02

-.06*

-.01

.21*

.11* -.04*

-.02

-.02

-.02 -.04* -.04*

-.02 -.04* 1.00

Universities / Graduate Schools

16

-.05*

.03

.00

.02

.30*

.14*

-.02

-.01

-.01

-.01

-.01

-.02

-.02

Other Education Programs

17

-.03* .05*

.02

.06*

.31*

.18* -.03*

-.02

-.02

-.02 -.03* -.03*

-.02 -.03*

-.02

-.01

1.00

Botanical Gardens and Parks

18

.04*

.00

-.02

-.01

.00

-.03*

-.02

-.02

-.02 -.03* -.03*

-.02 -.03*

-.02

-.01

-.02

Environmental Protection

19

.05*

.04*

.04*

.05* -.09* -.07* -.04*

-.02

-.02

-.02 -.05* -.05* -.03* -.04* -.04*

Dis eas es and Dis orders

20

-.03* -.07* -.08* -.09* -.07* -.12* -.05* -.03* -.03* -.03* -.05* -.06* -.03* -.05* -.04*

-.03 -.03* -.03* -.05*

Medical Research

21

.03*

-.02

-.01

-.02

-.01

-.02 -.03*

1.00

Patient and Family Support

22

.01

Treatment and Prevention Services

23

.01

.02

Children and Family

24

.01

.00

3

-.02

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

.00

20

21

22

.01

-.02

-.01

-.02

1.00

-.02 -.03* -.03*

1.00
1.00

-.01

-.01

.01

-.01* -.03* -.03*

-.02

-.02

-.02 -.03* -.04*

-.02 -.03* -.03*

-.02

-.02

-.02 -.03* -.04*

-.02

1.00

.02

.02

-.03*

-.03*

-.02

-.01

-.01 -.03* -.03*

-.02 -.03*

-.02

-.01

-.02

-.02

-.01

-.02

.01

.03*

.03

-.01

-.02 -.04*

-.02

-.02

-.02 -.04* -.04*

-.02 -.04* -.03*

-.02

-.02

-.02 -.04* -.04*

.02

.11*

.13*

.03*

.06*

.00

Multipurpose Human Services

27

-.02 -.03* -.06* -.05* .08*

.02

Social Services

28

-.01

-.01

-.01 -.05* -.03* -.03* -.03* -.05* -.06* -.03* -.05* -.04*

.01

-.01

-.04* -.03*

.04*

.15* -.09*

-.03

1.00

-.01

.01

-.02

1.00

-.05 -.03* 1.00

-.02

.05* -.05*

-.01 -.04* .04*

-.02

1.00

25

29

19

1.00

26

30

18

1.00

Food Banks , Food Pantries

Youth Development

17

1.00

Homeles s Services

Development and Relief

16

.05*
.01

-.01 -.03*

.01

-.03 -.03*

-.02 -.03*

-.02 -.04*

-.02

-.02

-.02 -.04* -.04*

-.02 -.04* -.03*

-.02

-.02

-.02 -.04* -.04*

-.02 -.03*

-.05* -.04*

-.02

-.02

-.02 -.04* -.04*

-.02 -.04* -.03*

-.02

-.03

-.03 -.04* -.05*

-.02 -.03*

-.02

-.02

-.02 -.04* -.04*

-.02 -.04* -.03*

-.02

-.02

-.02 -.03* -.04*

-.02

-.04*

-.03

-.03 -.03* -.03* -.05* -.06* -.03* -.04*

-.01 -.05*

-.03

-.02

-.02 -.05* -.05* -.03* -.05* -.04*

-.02 -.03* -.03* -.04* -.05*

-.02 -.03*

.02

.02

.10*

.06* -.09* -.07* -.04*

-.02

-.02

-.02 -.04* -.05*

-.02 -.03*

-.02 -.03*

.07* -.06* -.03*

Humanitarian Relief

31

.00

.04*

.10*

International Peace, Security

32

.01

.01

.00

Single Country Support

33

-.01

.02

.04*

.04* -.06* -.05* -.03*

-.02

-.02

-.02 -.03* -.03*

-.02 -.03*

Advocacy and Civil Rights

34

-.01

-.01 -.06* -.03* -.08* -.06* -.04*

-.02

-.02

-.02 -.04* -.04*

-.02 -.04* -.03*

Community and Housing

35

-.01

.05*

.08*

.07*

-.03

-.01

-.01

-.01

Community Foundations

36

.02

.05*

.05*

.06* -.08*

-.02 -.03*

-.02

-.02

-.02 -.03* -.03*

-.03* -.07*

.02

-.02

-.01

-.01

-.01

-.04* -.04* -.03*

-.02

-.02

-.02 -.03* -.04*

-.01

.18*

-.02

-.03

-.02

-.03 -.04* -.03*

-.03

-.01

-.02

-.01

-.01

-.01

-.02

-.01

-.02

-.02 -.03* -.03*

-.02

-.02

-.02 -.03* -.04*

-.02

-.02

-.02

-.02

-.02 -.03* -.04*

-.02

-.02

-.02 -.03*

-.03 -.04* -.05*

-.02 -.03*

-.01

-.02

-.03 -.04* -.05*

-.03

-.03

-.02

-.02

-.01

-.02

-.02

-.02 -.03*

-.01

-.02

-.02 -.03* -.03*

-.02

-.02

-.02 -.03* -.04*

-.02

-.02

Fundraising Organizations

37

-.02 -.07*

.00

.03* -.06* -.03* -.03* -.03* -.06* -.06* -.03* -.06* -.05* -.03* -.04* -.04* -.06* -.07* -.03* -.04*

Res earch and Public Policy

38

.01

.02

.01

-.03

-.02 -.03*

-.02

-.02

-.02 -.03* -.04*

-.02 -.03* -.03*

-.02

Religious Activities

39

.01

-.06*

.01

-.05* -.05* -.09* -.04*

-.02

-.02

-.02 -.04* -.05*

-.03 -.04* -.04*

-.02 -.03* -.03* -.04* -.05*

-.02 -.03*

Religious Media and Broadcasting

40

.01

-.07*

-.02 -.07* -.04*

-.02

-.02

-.02 -.03* -.03*

-.02 -.03* -.03*

-.02

-.02

.01

-.03 -.03*
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-.02
-.02

-.02 -.03* -.04*
-.02 -.03* -.04*

-.02

-.02
-.02

Table 3. Continued.
Variable #

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

1.00

24

-.02

1.00

25

-.02

-.03*

26

-.02

-.03* -.03*

27

-.02

-.03* -.03* -.03*

1.00
1.00
1.00

28

-.03* -.04* -.04* -.05* -.04*

29

-.03* -.04* -.04* -.04* -.04* -.05*

1.00
1.00

30

-.03

31

-.01

32

-.02

33

-.02

34

-.02

35

-.01

-.02

-.02

-.02

-.02

-.03*

-.02

-.01

-.02

-.02

-.02

1.00

36

-.02

-.03

-.03

-.03*

-.03

-.04* -.03* -.03*

-.02

-.02

-.02

-.03*

-.02

37

-.03* -.03* -.04* -.03* -.05* -.04*
-.02

-.02

-.03* -.03* -.03*

-.03

-.04* -.03* -.03*

-.02

-.02

-.04* -.03* -.03*

-.02

-.03* -.03* -.04* -.03* -.05* -.04* -.04*

-.02

-.02

-.03*

-.03

-.02

1.00

-.02

-.03

-.02

-.02

-.02

1.00
1.00
-.02

1.00

-.03* -.03*

1.00
1.00

-.03* -.05* -.05* -.05* -.04* -.07* -.06* -.05* -.03* -.04* -.04* -.05* -.03* -.04*

38

-.02

-.03*

-.04* -.03* -.03*

-.02

39

-.03

-.03* -.03* -.04* -.03* -.05* -.04* -.04*

-.02

40

-.02

-.03

-.03
-.03

-.03*
-.03*

-.03
-.03

-.04* -.03* -.03*

-.02

-.02

-.03*

-.02

-.03* -.03* -.04*

-.02

-.02

-.02
-.02

Note: * p < .05; n = 5,450
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-.03*

-.02

-.02

1.00
-.04*

1.00

-.03* -.05* -.03*
-.02

-.04*

-.02

1.00
-.03* 1.00

Table 4: Description of Charity Navigator Sectors and Industries
Sector Name

Count

% of Dataset

386
240
77
69
675
71
248
268
88
567
163
61
104
239
321
95
226
584
303
65
131
85
1195
161
153
190
146
308
237
510
207
57
133
113
880
193
123
73
365
126
332

0.07
.04
.01
.01
0.12
.01
.05
.05
.02
0.10
.03
.01
.02
.04
0.06
.02
.04
0.11
.06
.01
.02
.02
0.22
.03
.03
.03
.03
.06
.04
0.09
.04
.01
.02
.02
0.16
.04
.02
.01
.07
.02
0.06

210
122
5450

.04
.02
1.00

Industry Name

Animals
Animal Rights
Wildlife Conservation
Zoos and Aquariums

Arts
Libraries
Museums
Performing Arts
Public Broadcasting

Education
Private Elementary / Secondary
Private Liberal Arts Colleges
Universities / Graduate Schools
Other Education Programs

Environment
Botanical Gardens and Parks
Environmental Protection

Health
Diseases and Disorders
Medical Research
Patient and Family Support
Treatment and Prevention Services

Human Services
Children and Family
Food Banks, Food Pantries
Homeless Services
Multipurpose Human Services
Social Services
Youth Development

International
Development and Relief
Humanitarian Relief
International Peace, Security
Single Country Support

Public Benefit
Advocacy and Civil Rights
Community and Housing
Community Foundations
Fundraising Organizations
Research and Public Policy

Religion
Religious Activities
Religious Media and Broadcasting

Totals
Note = % of Dataset column does not total to exactly 1.00 due to rounding.
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Table 5: Pairwise ANOVA Comparison for Average Fiscal Performance Differences
between Charity Navigator Quadrants

Quadrant 1
Quadrant 2
Quadrant 3
Quadrant 4

n
1242
1052
1170
1975

Mean FP
0.90 (.08)
0.95 (.01)
1.05 (.02)
1.08 (.09)

Quadrant 1
.04*
.15*
.18*

Note: * p < .05, Standard deviations in parentheses
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Quadrant 2
.11*
.13*

Quadrant 3
0.02

Table 6: Clustered Regression Analysis of Complete Charity Navigator Dataset with Fiscal
Performance as the Dependent Variable

Variable
Intercept
Exploration
Exploitation
Ambidexterity
Organizational Age
Organizational Size (Log)

β
84.68 *
1.34 *
.27
-.01
-.11 ***
-.38

Adjusted R2
Model F

0.04 ***
38.23

Robust S.E.
8.10
.59
.25
.02
.02
.45

Note: *** p < .001; * p < .05
n = 3,935.
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t-Value
10.45
2.26
1.07
-0.67
-6.40
-0.84

Table 7: Regression Results for Industries with Significant Exploration, Exploitation, or Ambidexterity Effects

Exploration
Exploitation
Ambidexterity
Organizational Age
Organizational Size
(log net assets)
Constant

Animal
Rights
8.01* (3.75)
4.66† (2.65)
-0.2† (.11)
-0.15† (.08)

Private
Elementary
-10.91* (3.94)
-5.67* (2.78)
0.42** (.13)
-0.06 (.06)

Private
Universities
7.34** (2.67)
4.24** (1.56)
-0.21* (.08)
-0.07 (.05)

Food
Banks
-1.19 (.93)
-1.02* (.55)
0.03 (.02)
0.04 (.11)

International
Development
5.11* (2.18)
2.12 (1.32)
-0.13* (.06)
-0.37** (.13)

Fundraising
Organizations
2.63† (1.43)
-0.09 (.82)
-0.05 (.04)
-0.03 (.08)

-2.91 (2.19)
-24.48 (92.27)

1.31 (1.83)
213.23* (95.36)

-0.89 (.91)
-27.87 (50.32)

0.85† (.49)
129.09** (20)

1.74 (1.45)
7.21 (50.41)

-3.64* (1.43)
143.23** (35.26)

n = 189
F = 3.55**
Adj. R2 = .06

n = 139
F = 8.88***
Adj. R2 = .22

n = 90
F = 2.39*
Adj. R2 = .07

n = 108
F = 1.42
Adj. R2 = .02

n = 147
F = 3.99**
Adj. R2 = .09

n = 207
F = 3.61**
Adj. R2 = .06

Note: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10
Robust standard errors in parentheses
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Table 8: Representative Examples for Each Process and Relationships to Exploration or Exploitation
Exploration

Exploitation

Managing Knowledge

Coordinating
Best Practices

Leveraging
Local
Relationships

“Grand Rapids, Michigan started the mobile pantries.
They put food that was going to be thrown away on a
pantry that rolled. They took an old Coke truck or Pepsi
truck, put food on it and they invented the mobile
pantry. So you know, you go there to see how they
started it, but now we all do mobile pantries because
they did it so well. You know, that just goes on
network wide.”
(Executive director, Orange)
[I took a trip to two other food banks in the network]
one much bigger than us and one much smaller so a lot
to gain from both. It was pretty cool and you say "Man
I can't believe we weren't doing that." And you see
things that we were doing better than them. But they
both do some really, really cool things that I want to
get introduced here as soon as we're ready. It gets you
out of the box very quickly which is necessary.
(Volunteer coordinator, Orange)
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Our network has "Food Bank of the Year" awards
and recognitions. Now we're recognized for our
backpack program because we are the third largest
backpack program in the country. Chicago just
contacted us, "Will you mentor a new food bank
employee that's running their backpack program?"
(Executive director, Orange)
I just don’t remember calling up another plant
manager at another automotive industry to say,
“Hey, can I come over and look at your facility?”
The benchmarking wasn’t as easy in those industries
because everybody’s very competitive whereas I
think we all tend to now share more freely in this
organization and in this type of industry.
(Vice President of operations, Central)

Table 8. Continued.
Retaining Talent

Hiring
Professional
Management

You can’t operate with all volunteers. Not like this.
You have to have the best that you can afford and that’s
always been rough on us. You pay as much as you can,
and you get the best that you can get for that. And if
you are competitive it comes back to you with good
staff. You don’t want to train people and have them
jumping ship to go someplace where they can make a
lot more money. So you either provide benefits, make
the pay equitable or other intrinsic things that people
appreciate. We can’t have people working here who are
below the poverty level themselves. That’s a goal that
we need to adhere to.
(Executive director, Riverside)

I'm sure there's still some non-profits that feel like
they need to pay their director twenty grand and
their other people ten thousand dollars, but I don't
think there are many that are successful because
you've got to have the commitment and the positive
energy and wanting to come to work and wanting to
do what we're supposed to do.
(Executive director, Orange)

Outsourcing
Non-Core
Activities

We have used outside consultants in personnel until we
grew to be larger and now we have hired that person
who was on contract and they are now full time staff in
foods. So I think that if you just look and see what's
new and who can do it better and maybe at a much
more reasonable cost. I don't think that we always have
to have everything in-house. But I think you just have
to be business savvy.
(Executive director, Central)

We now hire a direct mail company in Boston that
does our direct mail. Back when I started we were
writing our own letters. We all started with maybe
four people and $300,000 budgets and handwriting
your letters to people. It costs us a ton. It’s totally
efficient and they’re very astute in how they write it.
They know how to get that dollar. So it costs us
$500,000 and we make a million. So it’s a no
brainer.
(Executive director, Orange)
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Table 8. Continued.
Enabling Leadership

Facilitating
Connections

Four or five years ago, we did not have Wal-Mart and
Sam’s Club donating to us at all because liability
issues, but now they do donate to us. A partnership was
formed at the national level. We couldn’t get the local
donations from some of the larger companies until that
partnership was formed at the national level. (Vice
President of community relations, Wright)

We are very blessed to have a national organization
that gives us best practices that really guides us in
the strategic planning process. We have a contract
with them so we have some guidance and some road
map to not stay where we are, but to go to the next
level from where we were in 1986 to maybe 1992,
we were in that grass roots organization stage and
then get to a larger organization.
(Executive director, Wright)

Encouraging
Experimentation

[The executive director] is probably one of the greatest
visionaries I've ever seen … she has an idea and she
wants you to get it done and she surrounds herself with
the people who get things done. Part of her great skill,
is having a vision and bringing it to fruition. She
surrounds herself with creative and innovative people
and then lets them do their thing. But there is always
parameters and as long you operate within the
parameters, she allows you to make mistakes.
(Executive chef, Central)

Well, we started with the [garden] downtown, which
was a grant for a community garden, and we got
property from the Housing Authority. So we put that
one in and people could just come and have a plot
maybe the size of this room and they could grow
whatever they wanted and they could keep whatever
they grew. The Housing Authority Director said,
“That’s terrible land. You’ll never grow anything
because it’s fill.” And it’s beautiful. So he was
wrong. We are growing for our own use and not for
someone else. (Executive director, Wright)
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Table 9: Managing Knowledge Quotes
Sub-Process
Coordinating
Best
Practices
Coordinating
Best
Practices
Coordinating
Best
Practices
Coordinating
Best
Practices

Leveraging
Local
Relationships

Leveraging
Local
Relationships
Leveraging
Local
Relationships
Leveraging
Local
Relationships

Exemplary Quote
Grand Rapids, Michigan started the mobile pantries. They put food that was going to be thrown away on
a pantry that rolled. They took an old Coke truck or Pepsi truck, put food on it and they invented the
mobile pantry. So you know, you go there to see how they started it, but now we all do mobile pantries
because they did it so well. You know, that just goes on network wide.
You know you go to conferences, they highlight something and you think, “Well that might work for us”
and you bring it back, yeah.
Our network has "Food Bank of the Year" awards and recognitions. Now we're recognized for our
backpack program because we are the third largest backpack program in the country. Chicago just
contacted us, "Will you mentor a new food bank employee that's running their backpack program?"
We are very blessed to have a national organization that gives us best practices that really guides us in
the strategic planning process. We have a contract with them so we have some guidance and some road
map to not stay where we are, but to go to the next level from where we were in 1986 to maybe 1992, we
were in that grass roots organization stage and then get to a larger organization.
And we just sent our volunteer coordinator who’s new to [another territory] because it’s such a bigger
facility and a lot more volunteers come through there and we are trying to grow our volunteer program
because we have a bigger building now so we can accommodate them. And then we sent him to [a
different territory] to watch their volunteer program because they’re about our same size. But you’ll see
something they do well that you weren’t doing well. And you’ll see something they’re not doing as well
as you. It’s just really good to send your people to other affiliates. They just get a bigger picture of what
they’re doing. So we just kind of keep growing that way.
I have never seen them as cooperative and as supportive of one another as they are here. We really aren't
that competitive in that. We are always competing for money but we are not like, "That's mine and you
don't get it." You try not to take total ownership in everything.
When I first came here we didn’t really have a lot of programs. We’re primarily a food bank where we
secure the food, store it and give it out to charities. We weren’t doing any direct service much where we
would actually give it to individuals and one of our first big programs of that type was our Food for Kids
program. It started with other food banks doing it and so some people here thought, “Hey, that’s a great
idea.”
I just don’t remember calling up another plant manager at another automotive industry to say, “Hey, can
I come over and look at your facility?” The benchmarking wasn’t as easy in those industries because
everybody’s very competitive whereas I think we all tend to now share more freely in this organization
and in this type of industry.
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Influencing

Source

Exploration

Executive
director,
Orange

Exploration

Exploitation

Executive
director,
Riverside
Executive
director,
Orange

Exploitation

Executive
director,
Riverside

Exploration

Executive
director,
Orange

Exploration

Executive
director,
Central

Exploration

Vice
President,
Wright

Exploitation

VP of
Operations,
Central

Table 10: Retaining Talent Quotes
Sub-Process
Hiring
Professional
Management
Hiring
Professional
Management
Hiring
Professional
Management
Hiring
Professional
Management

Hiring
Professional
Management

Outsourcing
Non-Core
Activities
Outsourcing
Non-Core
Activities
Outsourcing
Non-Core
Activities

Exemplary Quote
So back then if you did a survey of who ran nonprofits and how long they ran them, they were all women
and they were all social workers. If I was graduating from college today, I wouldn’t get a degree in social
work. I would get a degree in business or marketing. Then I would probably get my Masters or get a
MBA of some sort, maybe a law degree.
We capitalized on getting smart people that were in for-profit worlds and bringing them over to non-profit
and just setting them loose and saying, “If you’ve got an idea and it is going to be able to bring revenue
into the food bank and help us feed more people inside of our service area, then let’s do it. Let’s try it.”
I think any nonprofit today, if you wanted to survive you must be adaptable and you must be flexible and
your employees have to be adaptable and flexible and I tell people that come to work here, "If you don’t
like change, you don’t need to work here. If you don’t like being on a fast-pace and some days feel like
you are like that little mouse running on that wheel, you don’t need to work here," cause in any one
second you can have a disaster out there and we move into disaster mode.
I'm sure there's still some non-profits that feel like they need to pay their director twenty grand and their
other people ten thousand dollars, but I don't think there are many that are successful because you've got
to have the commitment and the positive energy and wanting to come to work and wanting to do what
we're supposed to do.
I guess it would be comparable to starting a little business. We were managing it [a new program] with
volunteers to begin with, but then we needed to bring on a staff person. We were just selecting product
out of the warehouse that would work with the program, which is healthy snacks and things children can
prepare on their own. But then as it grew, we had to start fine-tuning our planning to make it more
standard. We had to start ordering the food. We had to start associating a specific cost per child and we
finally got it down to a real workable thing and its own little program under our umbrella.
We have used outside consultants in personnel until we grew to be larger and now we have hired that
person who was on contract and they are now full time staff in foods. So I think that if you just look and
see what's new and who can do it better and maybe at a much more reasonable cost. I don't think that we
always have to have everything in-house. But I think you just have to be business savvy.
We now hire a direct mail company in Boston that does our direct mail. Back when I started we were
writing our own letters. We all started with maybe four people and $300,000 budgets and handwriting
your letters to people. It costs us a ton. It’s totally efficient and they’re very astute in how they write it.
They know how to get that dollar. So it costs us $500,000 and we make a million. So it’s a no brainer.
We use outside fundraisers, direct mail, which have been very beneficial. If we didn't do that we would
not be able to keep the doors open.
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Exemplary Quote
They've got Kraft's president on their board and ConAgra's president on their board. They're way up
here. American Airline's president is on their board. They're in Chicago and it's a national organization
and they feed people so a lot of people want to be affiliated with that.
On a national level, what they do is they solicit all the large food companies and get mega truck loads
of products that we could never access and get. In addition to that, they advocate on a national level in
Washington, D.C. for federal nutrition programs or other programs affect local food banks to ensure
that we are going to have access to those kinds of items. We can’t do that at a local level. It would take
too much energy and too much money to do that.
Food banking has become a pretty fine-tuned business operation. Four or five years ago, we did not
have Wal-Mart and Sam's Club donating to us because of liability issues, but now they do donate to us.
A partnership was formed at the national level. We couldn't get the local donations from some of the
larger companies until that partnership was formed at the national level.
In order to say we are an affiliate of Feeding America we must maintain those standards and they come
and inspect us every two years and write a report and say, "Yep, you’re above standard, or you are
minimal, or you need a lot of help and you need to maybe think about shutting down."
They don’t tell us what to do and how to do it, but they monitor our storage practices. We have a
contract. And as long as we are within that contract, you know, we are good. They will come every
other year and visit us and see how we keep our warehouse and all our inventories. If it’s in line, if we
can account for everything, how well we work with the agencies, what they are doing.
Surrounding yourself with the people who have the strengths you don’t. And it doesn’t matter what
your strength is, you just make sure your trusted staff does what you don’t do well.
[The executive director] is probably one of the greatest visionaries I've ever seen … she has an idea
and she wants you to get it done and she surrounds herself with the people who get things done. Part of
her great skill, is having a vision and bringing it to fruition. She surrounds herself with creative and
innovative people and then lets them do their thing. But there is always parameters and as long you
operate within the parameters, she allows you to make mistakes.
Non-profits have had to say "Look, our top line is shrinking. We're going to have to become more
efficient to be able to provide the same number of pounds, same meals, and the same number of people
from last year to this year with fewer donations. We're going to have to be better at what we do.
My board is here to set policy and procedure and help lend that total strategic vision and support that
and make sure that they are being good stewards of the money that we receive and make sure that we
are spending it wisely and properly. That's their role. Their role is not to hire or fire or tell me what to
do or direct my programs or tell me where I need to run my truck.
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